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1Résumé long de la thèse
Les dix dernières années ont été marquées par une intensification des flux migra-
toires tant à l’intérieur des pays qu’entre les pays. Le nombre de migrants inter-
nationaux a atteint 244 millions (3,3% des population mondiale) en 2015 contre 222
millions en 2010, 191 millions en 2005 et 173 millions en 2000 (Nations unies, 2015).
Les données les plus récentes sur les migrations internes estiment quant à elles à 780
millions le nombre de personnes résidant dans une autre région que celle dans laque-
lle elles sont nées (PNUD, 2009), un chiffre qui sous-estime très largement la réalité
puisqu’il néglige toutes les mobilités circulaires, les migrations de transit et les mi-
grations de retour. Si la plupart des migrants internationaux empruntent des canaux
légaux pour migrer, certains candidats au départ font le choix de migrer de manière
illégale et courent ainsi un risque élevé de mort et d’exploitation. L’augmentation
de la mobilité humaine a suscité un intérêt accru de la part de la communauté in-
ternationale et dans le monde académique. Cela s’est traduit par une littérature
abondante sur les migrations, et notamment sur leurs conséquences économiques et
non économiques pour les migrants eux-mêmes, pour leurs familles restées au pays,
pour les pays d’origine et pour les pays d’accueil. Lorsque l’on adopte le point de
vue du pays d’origine, nombre de travaux insistent sur les changements induits par
la migration sur les conditions de vie des familles à travers les envois de fonds que
réalisent les migrants depuis leur lieu de résidence ou à travers les nouvelles idées
et normes qu’ils véhiculent au moment de leur retour. Leurs auteurs ont ainsi mis
en évidence l’impact positif de la migration et des transferts sur des variables aussi
diverses que l’investissement en capital physique ou humain, la démocratie ou le
fonctionnement des institutions, les normes sociales en faveur d’une plus grande
autonomie ou responsabilisation des femmes, etc. L’immigration a également un
impact sur les pays de destination. L’arrivée de migrants peut en effet agir sur les
2salaires des autochtones, l’innovation, l’investissement direct étranger, la composi-
tion de la main-d’œuvre productive, les comptes sociaux, etc.
Pour comprendre les retombées de la migration et agir de façon à en tirer le
meilleur parti, il importe au préalable d’identifier les facteurs qui agissent sur la dé-
cision de migrer des individus et sur la composition des flux migratoires. L’objectif
de cette thèse est d’apporter des éléments de réponse à cette question, dans le con-
texte de mobilité internationale. Le premier chapitre, intitulé « Inadéquation entre
profils et emplois occupés et sélection dans la migration : une analyse à partir de
données sur le marché du travail portugais », examine comment la façon dont les
immigrés s’insèrent sur le marché du travail agit sur les pratiques d’auto-sélection
dans la migration. Le point de départ de l’analyse est le constat que les immigrants
occupent souvent des postes aux exigences inférieures à leur niveau d’éducation.
Plusieurs facteurs peuvent en être à l’origine : les immigrants peuvent se heurter à
des obstacles comme le manque d’expérience professionnelle et de contacts sur le
marché du travail, ils peuvent aussi rencontrer des difficultés pour faire reconnaître
leur expérience et les titres qu’ils ont acquis à l’étranger, ils peuvent ne pas posséder
les connaissances linguistiques nécessaires, etc. La conséquence est donc qu’ils oc-
cupent des emplois pour lesquels ils sont surqualifiés. Dans ce chapitre, nous sup-
posons que les travailleurs se répartissent dans deux groupes de compétences : le
groupe des hautement qualifiés (dans lequel on va trouver tous les individus ayant
fait des études supérieures) et le groupe des peu qualifiés. En mobilisant les don-
nées issues d’une enquête employeurs-salariés avec suivi longitudinal conduite au
Portugal sur la période 2002-2009, nous estimons d’abord, pour chaque année, la
probabilité qu’un travailleur immigré originaire d’un pays donné soit sur-qualifié,
sous-qualifié ou qu’il ait le niveau de qualification exactement adapté aux besoins en
compétences de la profession qu’il occupe, selon son appartenance à la catégorie des
hautement qualifiés ou des peu qualifiés. Nous avons pour cela recours un model
logit multinomial. Dans une seconde étape, nous utilisons ces probabilités estimées
pour analyser dans quelle mesure l’inadéquation entre profils et emplois occupés
influence les pratiques d’auto-sélection dans la migration des personnes originaires
d’une quarantaine de pays. Pour ce faire, nous estimons un modèle dans lequel
3la variable expliquée est le rapport entre le nombre d’immigrés hautement quali-
fiés originaires d’un pays donné sur le nombre d’immigrés peu qualifiés originaires
de ce même pays observés à l’année n, et dans lequel l’une des variables explica-
tives est la différence entre la probabilité estimée d’être surqualifié chez les haute-
ment et les peu qualifiés. Les résultats de nos estimations suggèrent qu’une prob-
abilité forte d’être sur-qualifié entraîne une sélection négative des immigrés sur le
marché du travail portugais. Autrement dit, plus la différence entre la probabilité
d’être sur-qualifié chez les hautement qualifiés et chez les peu qualifiés est impor-
tante, plus la part des hautement qualifiés parmi les migrants est faible. A l’inverse,
une bonne adéquation entre profils et emplois occupés entraîne une sélection posi-
tive dans la migration. Ces résultats impliquent qu’à côté des politiques sélectives
mises en place par les pays d’accueil pour attirer des immigrants hautement quali-
fiés, des mesures devraient parallèlement être prises pour limiter le phénomène de
surqualification des immigrés, à travers notamment une meilleure reconnaissance
des diplômes étrangers, en collaboration avec les pays d’origine. Le chapitre 2, inti-
tulé « Information et aspiration à migrer illégalement. Quelques enseignement tirés
d’une expérimentation sur le terrain » et co-écrit avec Catia Batista, s’attache lui aussi
à analyser les facteurs qui agissent sur la décision de migrer en se focalisant sur un
groupe particulier d’individus : les jeunes hommes gambiens âgés de 18 à 25 ans.
L’attention est ici portée sur les facteurs qui conduisent ces individus à faire le choix
de migrer illégalement en Europe depuis la Gambie. Le choix de ce groupe est justi-
fié par le fait que l’émigration illégale vers l’Europe, bien qu’excessivement risquée,
y constitue l’une des options les plus prisées, à l’instar de ce qui peut être observé
dans d’autres pays subsahariens mais à une moindre échelle. Pour comprendre le
processus de décision, nous avons mis en œuvre une expérimentation sur le terrain
(lab-in-the-field experiment) dans plusieurs régions rurales de Gambie qui enreg-
istrent des taux d’émigration vers l’Europe extrêmement élevés. Concrètement, 406
jeunes hommes âgés de 18 à 25 ans ont été invités à participer à un jeu avec inci-
tations monétaires. Ce dernier a été conçu pour comprendre comment les joueurs
révisent leur choix de migrer ou non vers l’Europe en fonction de l’information qui
leur est donnée sur la probabilité de périr en route d’une part, et sur la probabil-
ité d’obtenir un statut de résident légal en Italie d’autre part. A chaque tour du
4jeu (dont l’ordre était aléatoire), il était attendu des joueurs qu’ils choisissent en-
tre deux options : migrer illégalement vers l’Europe ou ne pas migrer étant donné
des probabilités de périr en route et d’obtenir un statut de résident légal en Italie
à chaque fois différentes (les probabilités de périr en route et d’obtenir un permis
de résidence légale ou le statut de réfugié en Italie pouvant prendre 4 valeurs : 0%,
10%, 20%, and 50% pour la première et 0%, 33%, 50% et 100% pour la seconde).
Il était également demandé aux joueurs d’indiquer pour quel montant d’argent ils
seraient prêts à renoncer à migrer, le cas échéant. En parallèle de ce protocole ex-
périmental, une enquête a été menée pour collecter des informations sur les joueurs,
leur expérience migratoire ainsi que celle de leurs proches, etc. Cette recherche a
débouché sur plusieurs résultats. Les entretiens menés auprès des jeunes gambiens
ont tout d’abord montré que ces derniers avaient tendance à sur-estimer le risque
de périr en route, ainsi qu’à sur-estimer la probabilité d’obtenir un statut de rési-
dent légal en Italie. Le protocole expérimental a quant à lui révélé que la décision
de migrer illégalement vers l’Europe était influencée par les informations fournies
sur les probabilités de périr en route et d’obtenir un permis de séjour légal. Plus
précisément, lorsque la probabilité de périr en route augmente de 1%, la probabilité
de migrer diminue de 0,12 point de pourcentage. Elle augmente en revanche de 0,13
point de pourcentage lorsque la probabilité d’obtenir un statut légal en Italie aug-
mente de 1%. Fournir des informations précises sur ces deux dimensions est donc
susceptible de modifier les choix de migration. Les données recueillies par une en-
quête de suivi réalisée un an après l’expérimentation sur le terrain auprès de 263
joueurs montrent finalement l’existence d’une corrélation positive significative en-
tre les intentions de migrer déclarées à l’occasion du jeu et les départs effectifs en
migration dans l’année qui a suivi, même si le coefficient de corrélation est faible
Pour finir, le chapitre 3, intitulé « Polygamie, rivalité fraternelle et migration » et
co-écrit avec Flore Gubert, s’intéresse à la relation entre la structure des ménages et
la migration. Plus précisément, l’attention est portée sur un échantillon de jeunes
adultes maliens et le type d’union dans lequel se trouve leur mère (monogame, et
donc sans co-épouse.s, ou polygame, avec une ou plusieurs co-épouses) pour voir
dans quelle mesure celui-ci influence leur probabilité de migrer. Pour conduire cette
analyse, nous utilisons les données issues d’une enquête représentative auprès des
5ménages conduites au Mali en 2016, que nous combinons avec des informations is-
sues des différents recensements de population. Le choix du Mali est justifié par
l’importance et l’ancienneté du phénomène migratoire en provenance de ce pays,
ainsi que par la très forte prévalence de la polygamie dans la plupart des groupes
ethniques qui compensent sa population. En restreignant l’échantillon à l’ensemble
des hommes âgés de 15 à 40 ans dont la mère est encore en vie (et pour laquelle nous
avons donc des informations sur le type d’union), nous estimons un modèle de mi-
gration dans lequel la probabilité de migrer est régressée sur un certain nombre de
variables dont le type d’union (polygamie vs monogamie) de la mère biologique.
Afin de surmonter les défis d’identification liés au caractère endogène de la variable
relative au type d’union, nous instrumentons cette dernière par la prévalence de la
polygamie à l’échelle du district mesurée en 1987. Nos résultats suggèrent que la
probabilité de migrer est plus forte chez les hommes dont les mères sont dans une
union polygame. Nous poussons plus loin l’analyse pour comprendre les mécan-
ismes à l’œuvre. Les résultats de nos investigations nous conduisent à pencher pour
l’hypothèse d’une rivalité fraternelle (sibling rivalry). Il semble donc que la rival-
ité entre coépouses, documentée dans plusieurs articles récemment publiés, ait des
répercussions sur leurs enfants qui se retrouvent en rivalité en matière de migration.

7Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a growing flow of human mobility both internally and
internationally. The number of international migrants reached 244 million (3.3% of
global population) in 2015 compared to 222 million in 2010, 191 million in 2005, and
173 million in 2000 (United Nations, 2015), and stock of internal migrants are esti-
mated at 780 million people (UNDP, 2009). While most of the international migrants
move legally, some migrate illegally, facing high risk of death and exploitation. The
increase in human mobility has led to greater interest in the topic.
Indeed, it is documented in the literature that migration has economic and non-
economic implications for migrants themselves, their families left behind, their home
countries, and their host countries. From the home country perspective, migrants
and returnees are changing lives and livelihoods by sending remittances to help fi-
nance the needs of their households and communities, thereby increasing foreign
direct investment and human capital investment, improving democracy, shaping
political institutions, and changing social norms that empower women and foster
economic development1. At the same time, immigrants have impacts on receiving
countries. The inflow of migrants affects wages of natives, net fiscal benefits, inno-
vation, foreign direct investment, and productive labor diversity2. Harnessing the
1See Ratha et al. (2011) for a review on the impacts of remittances. Javorcik et al. (2011) find that
migrants attract foreign direct investment in home countries. McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) and
Batista et al. (2012b) show that migration affects educational outcomes. Docquier et al. (2011a),Batista
and Vicente (2011a), Chauvet and Mercier, 2014, and Batista et al. (2016) show that migration improves
political institutions and voting behaviors. Beine et al. (2013), Tuccio and Wahba (2015), and Bertoli and
Marchetta (2015) document how migration affects fertility norms.
2In the United States, Borjas (2003) shows that immigration flows reduce wages, especially low
skilled, while Ottaviano and Peri (2012) show that immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes
and find an overall positive average effect of immigration flows on wages of natives. Docquier et al.
(2011b) document zero to positive overall impact in OECD countries. Dustmann and Frattini (2014)
show that immigrants contribute to substantial net fiscal benefits and provide savings to the taxpayers
by migrating with educational qualifications paid by their home countries. Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle
(2010) document that increases in college educated immigrants increases the host country’s patent per
capita. Buch et al. (2006) show that states with more immigrants attract more foreign direct investment
in Germany. Alesina et al. (2016) document positive impacts of labor diversity on economic prosperity
due to immigration.
8benefits of migration requires our understanding of not only what affects the deci-
sion to migrate but also what determines who migrates. The objective of this thesis is
to contribute to our understanding of these questions in the context of international
migration.
The first Chapter examines the effect of occupational placement of immigrants
relative to their educational qualifications on their self-selection. The movement of
people from their home countries to host countries is associated with poor occupation-
skill match; a labor market phenomenon in which workers take up jobs for which
they are overqualified relative to the normal educational requirements. We assume
that workers self-select themselves into two skill groups; high skilled (those with
post-secondary education) and low skilled. Using an administrative matched employer-
employee data set for Portugal for the years 2002-2009, we first estimate the prob-
ability that an average worker from a particular country is overeducated, matched,
or undereducated relative to the skill needs of the occupation he takes upon immi-
gration. Second, using these estimated probabilities, we analyze how overeduca-
tion and appropriate skill-occupation matches affect selection of immigrants from
40 origin countries. The results suggest that overeducation leads to negative self-
selection of immigrants into the Portuguese labor market. Furthermore, the evi-
dence suggests that appropriate occupation-skill matches affect migration selection
positively. These results imply that receiving countries’ selective policies aimed at
attracting high skilled immigrants should also focus on reducing occupation-skill
mismatch, probably through degree recognition and standardization in collabora-
tion with sending countries.
Chapter 2, a joint work with Catia Batista, improves our understanding of the de-
terminants of the willingness to migrate illegally from West Africa to Europe. Illegal
migration to Europe by sea, though risky, remains one of the most popular migra-
tion options for many Sub-Saharan Africans. We implemented an incentivized lab-
in-the-field experiment in rural Gambia, the country with the highest rate of illegal
migration to Europe in the region. Sampled male youths aged 15 to 25 were given
hypothetical scenarios regarding the probability of dying en route to Europe, and of
obtaining asylum or legal residence status after successful arrival. According to our
data, potential migrants overestimate both the risk of dying en route to Europe and
9the probability of obtaining legal residency status. The experimental results suggest
that the willingness to migrate illegally is affected by information on the chances of
dying en route and of obtaining a legal residence permit. Our estimates show that
providing potential migrants with official numbers on the probability of obtaining a
legal residence permit and the risk of dying en route affect the likelihood of migrat-
ing. Follow up data collected one year after the experiment show that the migration
decisions reported in the lab experiment correlate well with actual migration deci-
sions and intentions. Overall the results in this Chapter indicate that the migration
decisions of potential migrants are likely to actively respond to relevant information.
In Chapter 3, coauthored with Flore Gubert, we examine the relationship be-
tween polygamy family structure and international migration. We use data from a
rich representative household survey and census from Mali; a country with a long
history of international migration and high polygamy rate to estimate the impact
of the polygynous status of mothers on their children’s migration decisions. To
overcome the identification challenges due to the endogeneity relationship between
polygamy and migration, we instrument polygyny status of mothers with histori-
cal polygamy rates at the sub-district level. Moreover, we identify the causal effect
of sibling rivalry by instrumenting having a migrant sibling with the share of male
siblings. We find a positive and statistically significant effect of polygyny status of
mothers on children’s migration decisions. We provide additional evidence support-
ing the effect due to sibling rivalry; having a migrant sibling increases the likelihood
of migrating. Our evidence suggests that co-wives’ rivalry as documented elsewhere
trickles down to children’s rivalry in migration. Our results in this chapter suggest
that in addition to economic reasons, international migration is also driven by social
reasons.
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Chapter 1
Occupation-Skill Mismatch and
Selection of Immigrants: Evidence
from the Portuguese Labor Market
Abstract1
This paper aims at investigating how the occupational placement of immigrants
relative to their qualifications affect their self-selection. Using an administrative
matched employer-employee data set for Portugal for the years 2002-2009, we first
estimate the probability that an average worker from a particular country is overe-
ducated, matched, or undereducated relative to the skill needs of the occupation he
takes upon immigration. Second, using these estimated probabilities, we analyze
how overeducation and appropriate skill-occupation matches affect selection of im-
migrants from 40 origin countries. The results suggest that overeducation leads to
negative self-selection of immigrants into the Portuguese labor market. Further-
more, the evidence suggests that appropriate occupation-skill matches affect mi-
gration selection positively. These results imply that receiving countries’ selective
policies aimed at attracting high skilled immigrants should also focus on reducing
occupation-skill mismatch probably through degree recognition and standardiza-
tion in collaboration with sending countries.
1I am grateful to Catia Batista, Flore Gubert, Pedro Freitas, Marta C. Lopes and Christoph Deuster
for their helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank participants of the 2016 Nova SBE PhD
Research Group Meeting, 14th IMISCOE Annual Conference, 10th Annual Meeting of the Portuguese
Economic Journal and IX Italian Doctoral Workshop in Empirical Economics. I am also grateful to the
Ministry of Employment for providing the data used and to Nova Fórum and Fundação para a Ciência
e Tecnologia for financial support. I acknowledge the European Doctorate Degree in Economics -
Erasmus Mundus (EDE-EM) Program for funding and support.
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1.1 Introduction
Over the last 15 years, the number of international migrants has grown rapidly. The
number of international migrants reached 244 million in 2015 compared to 222 mil-
lion in 2010, 191 million in 2005 and 173 million in 2000 (United Nations, 2015).
This growing number of migrants undoubtedly affects both receiving and sending
countries. To understand how international migration affects these countries, sev-
eral questions arise. What are the characteristics of these migrants? What is the
quality of human capital these migrants possessed? Is this capital worthy in the in-
ternational labor market? These are among the important questions that occupy the
debate on international migration. Though there is consensus to some answers to
these questions, others continue to be controversial.
On the one hand, the characteristics of international migrants remain very de-
batable. These characteristics include both observable characteristics such as age
group, gender structure, education levels, and non-observable ones such as ability,
risk and discount preferences. There are numerous studies that try to analyze the
skills or educational levels of those who migrate. Most of the debate has been cen-
tered around the characteristics or selection of immigrants2 especially from Mexico
to the United States. To date, there is no consensus on the selection of immigrants.
While studies such as Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Orrenius and Zavodny (2005),
and McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) find a positive selection of immigrants from
Mexico to the United States, Borjas (1987), Moraga (2011), and Ambrosini and Peri
(2012) concludes to a negative selection of immigrants.
2We focus on selection by education levels. Negative (Positive) selection implies more low (high)
skilled migrants migrating to the country than high skilled migrants.
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On the other hand, it is well documented that there is less than perfect inter-
national transferability of immigrants’ human capital into foreign labor market es-
pecially for the highly skilled (Mattoo et al., 2008; Kiker et al., 1997; Chiswick and
Miller, 2009). The skills that immigrants acquired before migration are not fully
utilized on the international labor market3. In particular when immigrants are com-
pared to natives, the evidence reveals that given the same occupation, immigrants
are mostly overeducated (brain waste or occupation-skill mismatch). This unfortu-
nate reality has negative impacts on the returns to investment in education (Dun-
can and Hoffman, 1981; Verdugo and Verdugo, 1989; Kiker and Santos, 1991; Alba-
Ramírez and Segundo, 1995; Carneiro et al., 2012).
A combination of these pieces of evidence raises two important questions. First,
does imperfect international transferability of human capital affects the decision to
migrate? According to Sjaastad (1962), migration is an investment that individuals
choose to realize when the expected return of migration exceeds its expected cost.
The expected return crucially depends on wages earned in the destination coun-
try which are in turn a function of skills possessed and their market value. This is
what makes the above question relevant. Second, does imperfect international trans-
ferability of human capital affects the migration decision of the highly-skilled and
low-skilled differently?
In this paper, we aim at answering to this second question. The answer to this re-
search question has important policy implications in that it can affect “brain drain”
flows, which have been shown to be very relevant for the economic performance of
both origin and destination countries of migration4. We introduce a fairly neglected
factor into the literature on migration selection. Most of earlier research explains mi-
gration selection with earnings inequality at origin, costs of migration, differences of
skill earnings premium between origin and destination (Borjas, 1987; Chiquiar and
3Skill mismatch can be due to imperfect information in the labor market (Groot and Van Den Brink,
2000), trade-off between different types of human capital such as education and experience (Sicherman,
1991), and employers unwilling or able to screen foreign qualifications (Chiswick and Miller, 2009). See
Aleksynska and Tritah (2013) for a review of evidence.
4This discussion is well informed by the traditional references such as Bhagwati and Hamada (1974)
or Grubel and Scott (1966) on the losses implied by the brain drain for the migrant home countries. This
negative view has however been balanced by more recent literature emphasizing the potential benefits
of skilled migration on the country of origin, namely in terms of educational gains such as shown by
Beine et al. (2001) and Beine et al. (2008) or Batista et al. (2012a), institutional improvements such as
Batista and Vicente (2011b) or Batista et al. (2016), entrepreneurial gains and business investment such
as Yang (2008) or Batista et al. (2017).
14
Chapter 1. Occupation-Skill Mismatch and Selection of Immigrants: Evidence from
the Portuguese Labor Market
Hanson, 2005; Grogger and Hanson, 2011), and recently with migration networks
and diaspora (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010; Beine et al., 2011). We argue that the
selection of immigrants can also be explained by occupation-skill mismatch. The
effects of occupation-skill mismatch on wages have been well documented in the
literature5 but little or nothing is known about whether and how occupation-skill
mismatch affects who migrates.
The main aim of this paper therefore, is to determine whether imperfect transfer-
ability of human capital or occupation-skill mismatch affects the selection of immi-
grants. To achieve this objective, we first augment the model of migration proposed
in Beine et al. (2011) by including occupation-skill mismatch as another determinant
of migration. Second, using Portuguese matched employee-employer panel data
for the years 2002-2009, we compute the probabilities that an average worker from
a particular country is undereducated, correctly matched, or overeducated. These
probabilities reveal that highly-skilled immigrants (that is, immigrants with post-
secondary education) are more likely to be overeducated and hence less likely to be
correctly matched than the low-skilled.
Finally, we analyze how mismatch affects the selection of immigrants which we
believe is the novelty of this paper. Our empirical analysis reveals that high-skilled
migrants are less likely to migrate than low-skilled ones when the difference be-
tween the probability of over-education for the high-skilled and the low-skilled in-
creases. Furthermore, we show that when the probability of correct skill match in-
creases, the high-skilled are more likely to migrate compared to the low-skilled.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we (pro-
vide a) survey (of) the related literature. Section 3 discusses the theoretical model,
the data sources and the empirical estimation. In section 4, we discuss the main
results of the paper. Section 5 concludes and gives some policy implications.
1.2 Related Literature
Since Roy (1951)’s well-known model of selection, understanding selection of immi-
grants has been at the forefront of research. The first work that formalizes selection
5See Hartog (2000) for a meta analysis of occupation-skill mismatch and wages.
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in the context of migration is the influential work of Borjas (1987) who applies Roy’s
model to analyze the selection of immigrants from Mexico to the United states. Ac-
cording to the predictions of Borjas (1987)’s theoretical model, the selection of immi-
grants depends crucially on earnings inequality in the origin and destination coun-
tries. In particular, migrants leaving from a country with high earnings inequality to
a country with low earnings inequality will be negatively selected, that is migrants
will be drawn from the lower half of the skill distribution. Borjas (1987)’s model,
though influential, has been criticized because of its assumption that migration costs
are constant across individuals.
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) argue that selection of immigrants can be positive
or negative depending on the cost of migration and its heterogeneity across skill
groups. The cost of migration for the highly-skilled is likely to be lower than for
the low-skilled due destination migration policies such as visa policies aimed at at-
tracting the high skilled. Their work compares Mexicans who migrated to the United
States and those who stayed using census data of both Mexico and the United States.
In a similar spirit, McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) show that migration networks
play a crucial role in determining the selection of immigrants. In particular, they
show that migrants from communities with high migration rate are negatively se-
lected while those from communities without established migration networks are
positively selected using data from the Mexican Population Project (MPP). This re-
sult confirms the important role of migration costs insofar as networks are expected
to reduce the cost of migration.
Recently, Moraga (2011) and Ambrosini and Peri (2012) conclude to negative se-
lection as predicted by Borjas (1987). The debate on the selection of immigrants,
especially from Mexico to the United States, remains controversial as different au-
thors conclude differently depending on the dataset used.
Elsewhere, the selection of immigrants to Europe and other countries has been
less studied compared to the USA. However, it has recently attracted some attention
probably because of the increase in migration flows over the last couple of decades.
Beine et al. (2011) study how diasporas (measured by number of migrants) affect
the selection of immigrants into 30 OECD countries in 1990 and 2002. Their analy-
sis reveals that diasporas lower migration costs and hence increase migration flows,
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especially for the low-skilled. As a result, they reduce the quality of immigrants in
terms of educational attainment. Similarly, Grogger and Hanson (2011) study the
selection and sorting of immigrants in OECD countries. They conclude that immi-
grants are positively selected when the absolute skill-related difference in earnings
between destination and source countries is large.
Quinn and Rubb (2005) first study how education-occupation matches influence
the migration decisions of Mexicans to the United States. Backed by a simple theo-
retical model, they show that indeed the decision to migrate is influenced not only
by the actual years of education but also the occupation-education matching. Their
results suggest that Mexican workers who are over-educated are more likely to mi-
grate while under-educated ones are less likely to migrate. They argue that the de-
sire to migrate by over-educated workers is driven by the potential of better matches
and subsequent increase in earnings.
This work is broadly related to the brain drain literature. On the one hand, the
brain drain literature such as argues about the negative welfare effects of high skilled
emigration on those left behind (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974), while Haque and
Kim (1995) showed that brain drain has negative effects on economic growth of
sending countries. On the other hand, the beneficial brain drain literature argues
that migration prospects under uncertainty have a positive impact on the human
capital development of the country of origin. The work of Beine et al. (2001) and
Beine et al. (2008) offered important theoretical and empirical contributions of the
macroeconomic implications of brain drain. Beine et al. (2001) theorized that the
prospects of international migration motivates investment in education. Beine et
al. (2008) offers empirical evidence that indeed high skilled emigration has positive
benefits on human capital development of some source countries while negative ef-
fect for others.
The beneficial brain drain literature has been criticized for being overly opti-
mistic. According to Schiff (2006), the impact of brain drain on growth and welfare
has been greatly exaggerated. His theoretical analysis asserts that allowing for the
possibility of brain waste and factoring out the additional cost of investment in ed-
ucation instead of investing in public good provision will result in smaller or zero
gain in economic growth and welfare. Along similar line of reasoning, Pires (2015)
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criticizes the model for not considering the role of brain waste or occupation-skill
mismatch. He theoretically argues that brain waste reduces the incentive to invest
in education, lowers the chances of positive self-selection, and thus reduces the pos-
sibility of beneficial brain gain.
The literature on the selection of immigrants though vast has neglected a famous
phenomenon of labor market; occupation-skill mismatch also known as brain waste.
With the exception of Pires (2015), who model how the risk of brain waste affects
brain drain; to the best of my knowledge, the impact of mismatch on the selection of
immigrants has never been studied. This paper aims at filling this void in the liter-
ature by introducing occupation-skill mismatch as a factor that affects the selection
of immigrants.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Theoretical Framework
Following the framework developed by Beine et al. (2011) and Grogger and Hanson
(2011), we consider workers’ decision to migrate governs by a simple linear utility
maximization problem. Specifically, assume that utility of an individual with skill
level h born in country i and staying in country i is given by:
Uhii = w
h
i + Ai + ei, (1.1)
where wi is the wage in country i, Ai is country i’s characteristics and ei is an iid
extreme value distributed error term. While, even those who stay at the country
of origin can experience skill-mistach, we assume that this is relatively negligible.
Additionally, we assume that individuals’ utilities are affected by country i’s char-
acteristics the same way irrespective of the skill level. If an individual migrated to
another country j, the utility is given by:
Uhij = w
h
ij(M
h
ij) + Aij + M
h
ij − Chij + ej, (1.2)
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where Mhij is the quality of the skill-job match of an immigrant with skill level h
from country i in country j. We assume that the skill gathered by the worker before
migrating might not be fully valued in the destination country. As shown in the liter-
ature, we also assume that wages are affected by the quality of the match. Moreover,
we assume that individual’s utility is directly affected by the quality of the skill-job
match. Last, Chij denotes the cost of migrating from country i to country j.
Denote Ni the number of individuals of migration age in country i and Nij the
number of people who actually migrated to country j. Under the assumptions that
errors follow iid extreme value distribution, as shown by McFadden (1984), the log
odds of skilled level h group from country i migrating to country j can be written as,
[
Nhij
Nhii
]
= (whij(M
h
ij)− whi ) + (Aij − Ai) + Mhij − Chij (1.3)
Equation 3 implies that this odds ratio depends on the difference between the desti-
nation wage (which is a function of the skill-job match) and the origin wage. It also
depends directly on the skill-job match, the cost of migrating, and the difference
between the destination and the origin country characteristics.
Consider individuals endowed with two types of skills, either high or low, and
denote h = 0 and h = 1 for low-skilled and highly-skilled individuals respectively.
Thus, we can write the log odds of migrating from country i to country j as:
ln
[
N0ij
N0ii
]
= (w0ij(M
0
ij)− w0i ) + (Aij − Ai) + M0ij − C0ij (1.4)
ln
[
N1ij
N1ii
]
= (w1ij(M
1
ij)− w1i ) + (Aij − Ai) + M1ij − C1ij (1.5)
Following Grogger and Hanson (2011), using equations 4 and 5, we can analyze
the selection of migrants from country i to country j. Taking the difference between
equations 4 and 5 and rearranging, we obtain:
ln
[
N1ij
N0ij
]
=
[
w1ij(M
1
ij)− w0ij(M0ij)
]
+
(
M1ij −M0ij
)
−
(
C1ij − C0ij
)
+ ln
(
N1ii/N
0
ii
)
−
(
w1i − w0i
)
(1.6)
Equation 1.6 indicates that the selection of migrants is determined by five terms. The
1.3. Methodology 19
first term is the difference between the earnings of the two groups. The second term
is the difference between the quality of the occupation-skill match. The third term
gives the difference between the cost of migrating for highly-skilled and low-skilled
individuals. The final two terms of Equation 6 are the log ratio of the number of
highly-skilled individuals to the number of low-skilled individuals in country i and
the differences in earnings of highly-skilled and low-skilled individuals in country i.
We expect that there will be positive selection, translating into a higher propensity to
migrate among highly-skilled individuals, if the wage gap in the destination country
is positive. There will also be positive selection if the skills of the highly-skilled
individuals are more valued in the destination country relative to those of the low-
skilled.
1.3.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The primary data are taken from the Quadros de Pessoal (QP). The QP is a rich data
set of firms and employees collected yearly by the Portuguese Ministry of Labor
and Social Solidarity. All firms that have at least 10 employees are mandatory re-
quired by law to provide data about their employees and main characteristics. The
data on the employees provide each worker’s unique social security identifier, as
well as information on nationality, gender, age, tenure, education, earnings, hours
worked, etc. The firm characteristics include its location, economic activity, number
of employees, etc. While this data set is rich with individual and firm level character-
istics, it’s usage requires supplementing it with origin country level characteristics
which is mostly unavailable or challenging to acquire. Moreover, the sample only
cover workers who are legal residents, thus omitting especially illegal or irregular
migrants. Illegal migration is pronounced especially from Eastern European coun-
tries as documented by 2001 regularization process. The number of permits granted
to illegal migrants during the process amounted to 126,901 with 56 percent coming
from Eastern European countries (Baganha et al., 2004). Additionally, some illegal
migrants especially from Nepal, India, Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Vietnam
work in the agricultural sector in the Alentejo region6.
6Algarvedailynews.com (2017) "Export boom in agriculture due to illegal immigrant labour" (Last
accessed 15 March 2019 at https://algarvedailynews.com/news/11296-export-boom-in-agriculture-
due-to-illegal-immigrant-labour)
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The data cover years ranging from 1986 to date, with the exception of 1990 and
2001. We restrict our analyses to the 2002 to 2009 period, as the nationality of workers
was not recorded in the survey before 2000. The data set provides no information
on the date of arrival of migrant workers in Portugal. However, following Cabral
and Duarte (2013), we use the year when workers first appeared in the database as a
proxy for their date of arrival. Thus, forming a panel data set of natives and foreign
born workers, where foreign born workers are defined as workers who declare their
nationality to be any other country apart from Portugal
The education years of workers are coded as: 0 years (less than 1st cycle) , 4
years (1st cycle) , 6 years (2nd cycle), 9 years (3rd cycle), 12 years (secondary), 13
years (post secondary but less than Bacharelato), 14 years (Bacharelato), 15 years (Li-
cenciatura), 17 years (master), and 20 years (doctorate). In line with Beine et al. (2011)
and Grogger and Hanson (2011), we define the high skilled as workers with those
with post secondary level of education. Experience is defined as age less tenure less
years of education and 6 years . Last, the occupational category that we use is the 3
Classificação National de Profissões (CNP 94) which have a total of 276 occupations.
The final sample used for the econometric analyses is restricted according to the
following rules. First, when workers appear more than once in the database of a
given year, we keep the job associated with the highest wage. Second, we only
include workers aged between 15 and 80 years. Third, since it is illegal by law to
pay workers at a wage below 80 per cent of the minimum wage (Cabral and Duarte,
2013), only workers with reported earnings of more than 80 per cent of the 2002
minimum wage are included in the analyses . Finally, the analysis is restricted to the
top 40 sending countries of immigrants into the country.
Table 1.1 below presents the descriptive statistics of some selected variables by
skill group of the pooled sampled of migrants. Highly-skilled immigrants account
for 36 per cent of the sample over the period under concern. On average, highly-
skilled immigrants have 14.1 years of education while low-skilled ones have 7.2
years of education. Moreover, in comparison to the low-skilled, the highly-skilled
have a higher proportion of females, higher hourly wages, less years of experience.
They also have spent less years in Portugal.
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TABLE 1.1: Sample Means of Selected Variables
Variable Full Sample High skilled Low skilled Difference
High skilled 0.36 - - -
Age 35.49 34.75 35.89 -1.13***
Education 9.64 14.10 7.19 -6.19***
Tenure 3.49 3.96 3.23 -0.73***
Experience 15.54 12.23 18.69 -6.46***
ln(Wages) 6.51 6.61 6.49 0.14***
Female 0.34 0.35 0.33 -0.02***
Years since migration 3.54 3.01 3.83 -0.82***
Observations 793,169 280,973 512,196 -
Source: Quadros de Pessoal database 2002-2009.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Additional data on GDP per capita and population is obtained from the World
Bank development indicators and United Nations Population Division respectively.
1.3.3 Occupation-Skill Mismatch and its Determinants
In this paper, two methods of computing the occupation-skill mismatch are em-
ployed. The first method due Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) requires computing
the mean and standard deviation of the education for each occupation. Under this
method, overeducated (respectively undereducated) workers are defined as work-
ers whose education level is more (respectively less) than one standard deviation
above (respectively below) the mean for that occupation. The second method first
proposed by Kiker et al. (1997) computes mismatch by using the modal years of ed-
ucation for each occupation. Workers are classified as overeducated (respectively
undereducated) if their education attainment is higher (respectively lower) than the
modal education attainment associated to their occupation7. While these two meth-
ods are largely used in the literature, the self-assessment method that relies on the
respondent deciding whether they are mismatch or not is another method docu-
mented in the literature.
Following these methods, we compute our occupation-skill mismatch variables
7The minimum mode is selected for occupations with multiple modes.
22
Chapter 1. Occupation-Skill Mismatch and Selection of Immigrants: Evidence from
the Portuguese Labor Market
using the three digit Classificação National de Profissões (CNP 94). The CNP is a stan-
dard detailed classification of occupations which contains four digits. Limiting our-
selves to the third digit leaves us with 276 occupations. However, in order to mini-
mize measurement errors, we follow Tsai (2010) and assume sector heterogeneity in
valuating education. Therefore, for each year, the modal and mean education attain-
ment is computed by occupation and by sector using the total sample of workers
whatever their migration status .
Table 1.2 presents the incidence of job-skill mismatch disaggregated by skill
level. The estimates show that depending on the method used (range method or
modal procedure),the incidence of over-education for the full sample varies between
33 and 52 percent. They also show that the job-skill match is less likely among
highly-skilled workers than among low-skilled ones. The modal approach report
larger incidence of overeducation than the range approach. This is unsurprising as
the range approach define correct matches as those within a range of one standard
deviation while the modal approach only compares with the modal years of educa-
tion. A comparison with Table 1.7 (shown in the appendix 1.A) show that indeed as
expected, natives are more likely to experience better occupation-skill matches.
TABLE 1.2: Incidence of Mismatch by skill group in 2002-2009
Variable Overeducated Matched Undereducated Observations
Mode
Low Skilled 38.24 38.96 22.88 512,196
High Skilled 80.72 14.60 4.68 280,973
Full Sample 53.29 30.33 16.38 793,169
Range
Low Skilled 18.27 65.50 16.23 512,196
High Skilled 61.05 38.24 0.71 280,973
Full Sample 33.42 55.84 10.24 793,169
Source: Quadros de Pessoal database 2002-2009 and own calculation.
In order to compute the probability of being overeducated, correctly matched or
undereducated by country and year, a multinomial logit model is employed. This
model can be expressed as:
Prob(Yij|Xi) = e
βkXi
∑3k=1 eβkXi
; i = 1, 2..., n; k = 1, 2, 3. (1.7)
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where Yi takes values k=1 if the worker i is overeducated, k=2 if he is correctly
matched, and k=3 if he is undereducated. Xi is a vector of worker’s characteristics
which includes job tenure, experience, gender, nationality, years since migration,
and skill group. n=number of workers. After estimating the multinomial logit, the
probabilities associated to each one of the three categories can easily be predicted for
each year and country and for each skill group.
1.3.4 The Effects of Mismatch on Selection of Immigrants
From the theoretical section, we observed that the selection of immigrants is deter-
mined by wages, occupation skill mismatch, and costs of migration. We can use
equation 1.6 to analyze the effects of occupation-skill mismatch on the selection of
immigrants by using the following econometric specification.
lnSit = γlnSit−1 + α0OEdi f fit + α1Wagedi f fit + β′Xit + ηi + µt + eit (1.8)
where Sit is the ratio of highly-skilled to low-skilled flows of migrants from country
i in time t, and OEdi f fit is the difference between the probability of being overe-
ducated for highly-skilled and low-skilled immigrants for each country i in time
t computed from the multinomial regression estimates. Wagedi f fit is the hourly
wage difference between highly-skilled and low-skilled immigrants from country i
in time t residing in Portugal. It is worth mentioning that, unlike Chiquiar and Han-
son (2005), due to data limitations, wages and the log skilled ratios at origin country
are excluded from the analysis. X is a vector of time-variant country characteris-
tics that affects migration flows such as GDP per capita, population, while ηi and µt
are country fixed-effects and time fixed-effects respectively. Additionally, while the
costs of migration is not explicitly observed in our data set, we proxy it by lagged
diaspora, which is shown to reduce cost of migration especially for the low skilled
migrants (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2010).
To estimate the above specification, we employ the system generalized method
of moments (SGMM) proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Unlike the Arellano
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and Bond (1991) first-differenced generalized method of moments (DGMM) estima-
tor, the SGMM estimation technique uses both the level equation of Equation 1.8 and
its first difference. According to Blundell and Bond (1998), compared to the DGMM
estimator, the SGMM estimator improves efficiency especially when the dependent
variable is highly persistent and the variance of the unobserved individual hetero-
geneity is high. Both the SGMM and DGMM estimators rely on the assumption that
the first difference errors are autoregressive of order one.
Throughout the estimation, we assume that the lagged diaspora variable is pre-
determined while the rest of the variables in Equation 1.9 are endogenous thus re-
quiring instruments for these variables. These instruments are obtained by using the
lags of the variables in the model. Fortunately, the validity of these instruments can
be tested using the Sargan overidentifying restriction test.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Occupation-Skill Mismatch and its Determinants
Before computing the probabilities of occupation-skill mismatch, it is interesting
to analyze the results from the multinomial logit model. Table 1.3 shows the re-
sults from the multinomial logit regression using the modal definition of mismatch
. The coefficients tell how each of the variables affects the probability of being over-
educated or under-educated compared to being correctly matched.
Column 1 of Table 1.3 shows that log odds of being overeducated compared to
being correctly matched is a decreasing function of years of experience and tenure.
The coefficient on experience shows that older workers in the labour market per-
forms relatively better in terms of the probability of being correctly matched. We
also observe that high skilled and female workers are more likely to be overedu-
cated. Surprisingly, the coefficient on years since migration is positive and statis-
tically significant, implying that workers who spent more years in the country are
more likely to be overeducated. One possible explanation for this is that immigrants
augment their education level after migration thus making them more skilled as
documented in Beine et al. (2007) and thus more likely to be overeducated.
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TABLE 1.3: Multinomial Logit Model Estimates of Occupation-skill
Mismatch
Variable Ln(OE/M) Ln(UE/M)
Experience -0.0304*** 0.0731***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Experience square 0.000003 0.00001***
(0.000003) (0.000004)
Tenure -0.0590*** 0.0953***
(0.0013) (0.0012)
Tenure square 0.00001*** -0.00002***
(0.000003) (0.000004)
Female 0.0279*** -0.0290***
(0.0075) (0.010)
High skilled 2.5227*** -2.3963***
(0.0087) (0.0242)
Years since migration 0.0501*** -0.0816***
(0.0022) (0.0025)
Years since migration squared -0.0035 0.0023***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 703,864
Pseudo R2 0.1816
Log likelihood -512704.29
χ2 (154) 227472.40
Source: Quadros de Pessoal database 2002-2009
Notes: Other controls not reported includes country and
time dummies, firm size,location, and sector of activity.
Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%;** sig-
nificant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
On the other hand, as shown in column 2 of Table 1.3, the odds of being un-
dereducated increases with years of experience and tenure. The dummies on female
and high skilled indicate that female and high skilled workers are less likely to be
undereducated. Moreover, the years since migration reduce the probability of being
undereducated.
Though the individual coefficient estimates from the multinomial logit model
are somewhat less informative, the model allows us to predict the probability that
an average worker from a particular country is over-educated, under-educated, or
correctly matched. We can further compute these probabilities by skill group for
each country. These estimates are very accurate especially for the average worker.
In order to predict these probabilities, averages of the variables in Table 1.3 are
employed for each country. Figure 1.1 below shows the predicted probabilities by
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country that an average worker is over-educated in year 2002 using the modal defi-
nition of job-skill mismatch.
FIGURE 1.1: Estimated probability (in percentages) that a worker is
overeducated in 2002
The results from Figure 1.1 show that the probability for an average worker to be
over-educated is heterogeneous across countries with the Philippines recording the
highest probability (67 percent) and China the lowest one (17 percent). One possible
reason for the better job-skill match among Chinese immigrants is their high propen-
sity to become entrepreneurs as shown in Oliveira (2003). After the Philippines,
countries of the Eastern European region (Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and Romania)
are among the countries with the highest estimated probabilities. With a few excep-
tions, Western European countries perform much better, with estimated probabili-
ties ranging from 31 to 41 percent. Not surprisingly, immigrants from Portuguese-
speaking countries with which Portugal has historical ties also perform relatively
better, excepted Brazil which records quite a high probability (46 percent). The re-
sults from Figure 1.1 are consistent with Mattoo et al. (2008) who also found highly
heterogeneous job-skill mismatch rates among immigrants in the United States de-
pending on their country of origin.
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1.4.2 Mismatch and Selection of Immigrants
Table 1.4 shows how occupation-skill mismatch affects the selection of immigrants.
As mentioned earlier, both definitions of occupation-skill mismatch (range and mode)
are employed. However, irrespective of the definition, we find a significant negative
effect of mismatch on selection.
Specifically, column 1 of Table 1.4 shows how mismatch affects selection using
the range definition. We observe that the coefficient of over-education differences as
expected is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent. These results suggest
that when the probability of overeducation is greater for the highly-skilled than for
the lowskilled, the former are less likely to migrate compared to the latter (negative
selection). Column 2 of Table 1.4 shows similar findings though with a coefficient of
higher magnitude. These results are consistent with our theoretical predictions that
indeed the selection of immigrants is also explained by skill mismatch.
The estimated coefficients of the control variables included in the estimation have
the expected signs with the exception of the coefficient associated to the wage differ-
ence of the highly-skilled and low-skilled. The potential reason for the negative sign
of the coefficient is due to omitting the wages prevailing in the country of origin. As
shown in Grogger and Hanson (2011), estimating the selection equation using origin
country wages is crucial. However, in this paper, we do not have data on wages in
the origin countries. As observed elsewhere in Beine et al. (2011), diaspora leads to
negative selection of immigrants. The reason for this negative effects stems from the
established fact that diaspora provides networks assistance that tend to reduce the
cost of migration especially for the unskilled. Moreover, from the coefficient of GDP
per capita, the results suggest that immigrants from richer countries are positively
selected.
As per the GMM assumptions of no serial correlation, the results suggest that
indeed this assumption is satisfied. Moreover, the Sargan test shows that the overi-
dentifying assumption is also satisfied with p-values of 0.1286 and 0.1063 for the
range and mode definitions respectively.
Similarly, Table 1.5 shows how correct matches affects selection. The results
from Table 1.5 are also consistent with our theoretical predictions. The coefficient of
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TABLE 1.4: Impact of Overeducation on Selection
Variable Ln(skill ratio) Ln(skill ratio)
Range Definition Mode Definition
Overeducation differences -0.0135** -0.0264**
(0.0067) (0.0117)
Wage differences -0.0086 -0.0000
(0.0166) (0.0156)
Lagged diaspora (stock) -0.0090 -0.0152*
(0.0083) (0.0085)
GDP Per Capita 0.0298*** 0.0325***
(0.0054) (0.0043)
Population -0.0006* 0.0000
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Lagged skill ratio 0.1533** 0.1161**
(0.0580) (0.0606)
Sargan P-Value 0.1420 0.2671
AR(1) 0.0002 0.0004
AR(2) 0.6817 0.9126
No of Instruments 119 117
Countries 40 40
Observations 262 262
Source: Quadros de Pessoal database 2002-2009
Notes: Regressions estimated using a system GMM. Ln(skill ra-
tio) is log ratio of highly-skilled to low-skilled flow of migrants.
Standard errors in parenthesis. * significant at 10%;** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
occupation-skill match differences between highly-skilled and low-skilled is as ex-
pected positive and statistically significant. This implies that when the probability
of correct occupation-skill match is higher for the highly-skilled than for the low-
skilled, the former are more likely to migrate; hence we have positive selection. Sim-
ilar to the results provided in Table 1.4, with the exception of wages, the coefficients
of the control variables have the expected signs.
The results from the post-estimation tests show that the GMM assumptions are
satisfied. As expected, the results from the autocorrelation test show that we can-
not reject the hypothesis of zero autocorrelation in first-differenced errors of order
2. Moreover, the results from the Sargan overidentifying restrictions test show that
moment conditions are satisfied at p-values of 0.1168 for the range definition and
0.1615 for the mode definition.
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TABLE 1.5: Impact of Correct Match on Selection
Variable Ln(skill ratio) Ln(skill ratio)
Range Definition Mode Definition
Occupation-skill match differences 0.0167** 0.0276**
(0.0074) (0.0187)
Wage differences -0.0111 0.0001
(0.0131) (0.0156)
Lagged diaspora (stock) -0.0057 -0.0133
(0.0085) (0.0086)
GDP per capita 0.0290*** 0.0276***
(0.0044) (0.0044)
Population -0.0015*** -0.0000
(0.0004) (0.0000)
Lagged skill ratio 0.1636*** 0.1145**
(0.0569) (0.0607)
Sargan P-Value 0.1168 0.3614
AR(1) 0.0001 0.0006
AR(2) 0.4753 0.9868
No of Instruments 92 117
Countries 40 40
Observations 262 262
Source: Quadros de Pessoal database 2002-2009
Notes: Regressions estimated using a system GMM. Ln(skill ratio) is log
ratio of highly-skilled to low-skilled flow of migrants. Standard errors in
parenthesis. * significant at 10%;** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
1.5 Conclusion
Occupation-skill mismatch is a well-known labor market phenomenon especially for
immigrants. The implications of this mismatch especially on wages have been exten-
sively studied. However, little is known about the impact of mismatch on selection
of immigrants. In this paper, using a panel data of immigrants from 40 countries
in Portugal, we show that indeed occupation-skill mismatch affects the selection of
immigrants. The results suggest that the probability of overeducation leads to nega-
tive selection of immigrants. Furthermore, we show that when probability of correct
matches increases, the highly-skilled are more likely to migrate than the low-skilled
(positive selection). This study has contributing to the existing literature by focusing
on a fairly neglected factor (occupational-skill mismatch) in explaining selection of
migrants.
The results from this paper have implications for sorting of immigrants. From
the results, we observe that due to overeducation, the highly-skilled are less likely
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to migrate compared to the low-skilled. This finding raises another interesting ques-
tion for further research. How does occupation-skill mismatch affects the sorting
of immigrants among different destination countries? That is, will migrants prefer
migrating to countries with better skill matches? The framework developed in this
paper can be extended to include more than one destination country. To answer this
question, one would need data on not only one country as we have in this paper, but
also data on immigrants in other destination countries.
From a policy perspective, these findings also have some implications. Receiv-
ing countries’ selective policies aimed at attracting highly-skilled immigrants should
also inculcate reducing occupation-skill mismatch probably through degree recog-
nition and standardization in collaboration with sending countries.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Definition of Variables
Multinomial Logit Model
Dependent Variables Description
Ln(OEit/Mit) log ratio of overeducation to matched of individual i in time t
Ln(UEit/Mit) log ratio of undereducation to matched of individual i in time
t
Independent Variables Description
Experience Age - 6 - tenure- years of education
Tenure (number of years in current firm) Current year - year the worker started working for the firm
Female Dummy variable equal 1 for female and equal 0 for male
High Skilled Dummy variable equal for workers with more than 12 years
of education and zero otherwise
Years since migration This is a proxy for year the worker entered the country. Fol-
lowing Cabral and Duarte (2013), we proxy the year of migra-
tion with the minimum of the year the worker first appeared in
the database. This is achieved my tracing back the worker ID
number to the year that it appears from the data base starting
from 1986.
Selection Equation
Dependent Variable Description
Ln(Skill Ratio) log ratio of the flow of high skilled to low skilled immigrants.
Independent Variables Description
Overeducation differences Probability of overeducation for high skilled migrant - proba-
bility of overeducation for low skilled migrant.
Occupation-skill match differences Probability of occupation-skill match for high skilled migrant
- probability of occupation-skill match for low skilled migrant.
Wage differences Average high skilled hourly wage - Average low skilled hourly
wage.
Lagged Diaspora number of immigrants from the origin in the previous year.
GDP per capita Gross domestic product per capita of the country of origin.
Population Total population of the country of origin.
Lagged skill ratio log ratio of the flow of high skilled to low skilled immigrants
in the previous.
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1.A.2 Incidence of Mismatch by skill group in 2002-2009 (native workers)
TABLE 1.7: Incidence of Mismatch by skill group in 2002-2009
Variable Overeducated Matched Undereducated Observations
Mode
Low Skilled 31.30 39.89 31.30 10,087,364
High Skilled 38.40 41.55 20.23 12,140,961
Full Sample 33.95 40.80 25.25 22,228,307
Range
Low Skilled 11.83 71.09 17.04 10,087,364
High Skilled 14.93 75.24 9.83 12,140,961
Full Sample 33.95 40.80 25.25 22,228,307
Source: Quadros de Pessoal database 2002-2009 and own calculation.
1.A.3 Number of Workers
TABLE 1.8: Number of workers
Year Natives Migrants
2002 2,543,691 95,792
2003 2,552,969 116,897
2004 2,604,026 125,956
2005 2,920,259 146,620
2006 2,859,951 146,190
2007 2,952,052 153,185
2008 2,005,729 168,552
2009 2,889,639 155,139
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Chapter 2
Understanding Willingness to
Migrate Illegally: Evidence from a
Lab-in-the-Field Experiment
Abstract1
Illegal migration to Europe through the sea, though risky, remains one of the most
popular migration options for many Sub-Saharan Africans. This study aims at im-
proving our understanding of the determinants of the willingness to migrate ille-
gally from West Africa to Europe. We implemented an incentivized lab-in-the field
experiment in rural Gambia, the country with the highest rate of illegal migration to
Europe in the region. Sampled male youths aged 16 to 25 were given hypothetical
scenarios regarding the probability of dying en route to Europe, and of obtaining
asylum or legal residence status after successful arrival. According to our data, po-
tential migrants overestimate both the risk of dying en route to Europe, and the
probability of obtaining legal residency status. The experimental results suggest
that the willingness to migrate illegally is affected by hypothetical information on
the chances of dying en route and of obtaining a legal residence permit. Our lab-in-
the field experimental set up allows us to estimate what would have happened to
1This chapter is co-authored with Catia Batista. We are grateful for comments from Alex Coutts,
Zack Barnett-Howell, Flore Gubert, David McKenzie, Julia Seither, Pedro Vicente, Abby Wozniak, and
participants in seminars and conferences at the Notre Dame Kellogg Institute, Oxford CSAE 2018 Con-
ference, PSE Casual Friday Development Seminar, DIAL-Dauphine Development Seminar, and the
Stanford Eleventh International Conference on Migration and Development. We also gratefully ac-
knowledge funding support from Nova School of Business and Economics and NOVAFRICA. The
first author acknowledge the European Doctorate Degree in Economics - Erasmus Mundus (EDE-EM)
Program for funding and support.
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willingness to migrate if respondents knew the actual chances of dying and obtain-
ing residence status. Comparing the round with the actual fact of risk of dying and
obtaining residency status with the average expectations, our estimated elasticities
show that providing potential migrants with official numbers on the probability of
obtaining a legal residence permit decreases their likelihood of migration by 2.88
percentage points (pp), while information on the risk of migrating increases their
likelihood of migration by 2.29pp – although the official risk information provided
may be regarded as a lower bound to actual mortality. Follow up data collected
one year after the experiment show that the migration decisions reported in the lab
experiment correlate well with actual migration decisions and intentions. Overall,
our study indicates that the migration decisions of potential migrants are likely to
actively respond to relevant information.
Keywords: International migration; Information; Expectations; Illegal migration;
Willingness to migrate; Lab-in-the-Field Experiment; The Gambia.
JEL Codes: F22, J24, O15, O55.
2.1 Introduction
Over the last decade, the world has witnessed a growing increase in the international
movement of people. In 2015, the total number of international migrants worldwide
reached 244 million (3.3 per cent of the world population), compared to 173 million
in the year 2000 (United Nations, 2015).
While most people migrate legally, there are large and increasing numbers of
irregular migrants. Illegal migration is a risky endeavor. Between 2000 and 2014,
more than 22,400 migrants were recorded as having lost their lives trying to reach
Europe (IOM, 2014)2. Illegal migrants traveling from West Africa to Europe face a
variety of serious challenges, including abductions for ransom, slavery, torture and
2Additional information from Missing Migrants project documented that between 2014 and 2018,
17,390 migrants died in the Mediterranean(Missing Migrants Project, 2018)
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other ill-treatment during the migration process especially in Libya3. Notwithstand-
ing these risks, the Libyan route to Europe continues to be the main entry point of
irregular migrants from Africa. In 2017, 101,448 African migrants were recorded as
reaching Italy through the sea4.
The main aim of our work is to understand what determines the willingness of
individuals to migrate illegally from Western Africa to Europe. For this purpose,
we implemented a lab-in-the field experiment among potential migrants in rural
Gambia. The Gambia has an illegal emigration rate of 2%, making it the African
country with the highest incidence of illegal migration relative to its total population
(see Figure 2.3). Most of these emigrants come from the rural areas where our project
took place.
Experimental subjects played an incentivized migration game designed to elicit
willingness to migrate depending on varying chances of dying en route to destina-
tion, and of obtaining legal residency status. The experiment included 16 rounds,
where each round provided different combinations of hypothetical probabilities of
dying en route and of obtaining legal residency status in Europe upon arrival, while
keeping hypothetical wages fixed depending on the migration circumstances faced.
In each round, respondents made binary decisions about whether to migrate to Italy
or stay in Gambia. They also reported their willingness to pay for the migration
cost (out of their game endowment) and decided on how large a payment they were
willing to accept in order to forgo migrating. While one of the rounds provides fac-
tual information on the risk of dying en route and the chances of obtaining residence
status, this was unknown to respondents.
Our data show that 47 percent of the respondents are willing to migrate illegally.
In addition, on average potential migrants overestimate both the chances of dying
en route and of obtaining a legal residence permit. The expected probability of dy-
ing en route is 30pp higher than the actual probability reported by official numbers;
while the expected chances of obtaining a residence permit are 7pp higher than the
actual probability. Our experimental counterfactual results predict that providing
3See Amnesty International (2015) and CNN (2017)
4The top country of origin includes Nigeria, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire (see Figure 2.2)
36
Chapter 2. Understanding Willingness to Migrate Illegally: Evidence from a
Lab-in-the-Field Experiment
potential migrants with accurate information on the probability of obtaining a le-
gal residence permit would decrease their likelihood of migration by 2.88pp, while
receiving accurate information on the risk of migrating would increase their likeli-
hood of migration by 2.29pp – although official numbers may be regarded as lower
bounds to actual mortality. Overall, our study suggests that the migration decisions
of potential migrants actively respond to information about relevant facts regarding
costs and benefits of migration. These findings are shown to be robust to concerns
related to the interpretation of the experimental migration decisions as related to ac-
tual migration decisions and intentions. One year after the experiment, follow up
data reveal that decisions in the lab correlates to actual international migration deci-
sions. Additionally, we provide evidence suggesting that lab decisions are positively
correlated with the expected net benefit computed for each round.
This paper contributes to the limited existing economics literature on illegal mi-
gration. While we are not the first to use experimental techniques to study the will-
ingness to migrate, our work is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to implement
a lab-in-the field experiment aimed at examining the determinants of illegal migra-
tion.
Our methodological contribution is related to a number of studies utilizing lab
experiments. Batista and McKenzie (2018) conduct an incentivized laboratory exper-
iment to test various theories of migration departing from the neoclassical migra-
tion model of net expected income maximization, and considering also additional
and more realistic factors such as migrant-skill self-selection, credit constraints, in-
complete information and multiple destination choices. Using a sample of potential
migrants (graduating university students in Kenya and Portugal), their results sug-
gest that adding these realistic features to the neoclassical model, especially uncer-
tainty and imperfect information, brings migration decisions to levels much more
consistent with reality than the ones implied by simpler income maximization con-
siderations. In a recent complementary piece of work,Barnett-Howell (2018) used a
migration video game in a lab experiment to examine how individuals in the United
States and Ethiopia make migration choices. He also found an important role for
imperfect information in explaining lack of movement. Relatedly, Lagakos et al.
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(2018) conducted a discrete choice experiment in Bangladesh to understand the rel-
ative weights people place on migration related factors such as the quality of living,
relative to wages or family separation in making internal migration decisions. Their
setup allows respondents to hypothetically choose between staying put or migrating
under two different scenarios. The options vary in terms of wages, unemployment
rates, and amenities at destination (namely, availability of a latrine facility and reg-
ularity of family contacts). This study shows that unemployment risk and housing
conditions are important determinants of (internal) migration decisions, while fam-
ily separation seems to act as less of a deterrent to rural-urban migration. In our
work, we follow this line of research in that we use an incentivized lab-in-the-field
experiment to test for relevant determinants of the willingness to migrate, although
our focus is more specifically on illegal migrants from West Africa and the extreme
risks they face in their migration journey.
Our work is also related to the role of the access of information in determining
international migration. The contributions of Shrestha (2017b) and Shrestha (2017a)
highlight the importance of access to information for potential migrants’ expecta-
tions and their subsequent migration decisions. Shrestha (2017b) offers evidence on
how the deaths of migrants in a district affect the subsequent migration decisions for
up to 12 months. He argues that migrants are not fully informed on risk of migra-
tion and thus update their beliefs after the occurrence of the dead within a district.
Furthermore, Shrestha (2017a) conducted a randomized field experiment providing
information on mortality rates during the migration journey and documented how
this information affected subsequent migration decisions in Nepal. More specifi-
cally, and consistent with our own findings, these experimental findings show that
providing information on mortality rates lowers expected mortality rates and pro-
viding information on wages at destination reduces expected wages especially for
less experienced migrants.
Though the phenomenon of illegal migration from Africa to Europe has attracted
a lot of media attention as of lately, most literature on illegal migration has focused
on illegal migration from Mexico to the USA, and particularly on the consequences
of immigration policies on illegal migration from the US to Mexico. Orrenius and
Zavodny (2003) show no long term impact of amnesty programs on the flow of
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undocumented migrants. Gathmann (2008) showed that stricter border control in-
creased prices of border smugglers (’coyotes’) by 17%, while the demand for smug-
glers remained unchanged. The strongest effect of tighter enforcement was a shift
of illegal migrants to remote crossing places. Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2013) show
that tougher immigration measures such as E-verify that is a mandate obliging em-
ployers to check the work authorization of employees, have impact on deportation
fears, interstate mobility, and reduces deportees’ intentions to return to the US. Sim-
ilarly,Amuedo-Dorantes and Lozano (2015) show that the SB1070 law in Arizona
which made it crime for an alien not to carry proper documentation has little effect
on reducing the share of undocumented immigrants.
There are only a few studies that study the willingness to migrate illegally from
West Africa. Mbaye (2014) and Arcand and Mbaye (2013) provide the first papers
describing the determinants of the willingness to migrate illegally in this context.
They use data from a survey of about 400 individuals in Dakar to offer important
contributions to the understanding of illegal migration from Senegal. Mbaye (2014)
shows that potential migrants are willing to accept a high risk of dying en route and
that they are mostly young, single, and lowly educated. Moreover, she argues that
the price of illegal migration, migrant networks, high expectations, and tight im-
migration policy significantly explain willingness to migrate illegally. Arcand and
Mbaye (2013) study how individual risk-aversion and time preferences affect the
willingness to migrate illegally and to pay for smuggling services. They propose a
theoretical model showing that the willingness to migrate and to pay a successful
smuggler is influenced by risk aversion and time preferences. The empirical analy-
sis confirms that the willingness to pay for a smuggler is an increasing function of an
individual’s intertemporal discount rate, and a decreasing function of risk-aversion.
More recently, Guido et al. (2017) study the impact of distance on individual inten-
tions to migrate from Africa into Europe. Using the demise of the Gaddafi regime
in 2011 as an exogenous source of variation that affects the distance from Africa to
Europe due to increase in the usage of the central Mediterranean route (Libya to
Italy), they found negative effects of distance on the intentions to migrate. The effect
is especially larger for educated youth with a migration network.
Our paper builds on these contributions by offering additional evidence on the
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roles of the probability of dying en route and of obtaining permit on willingness to
migrate illegally. Moreover, we conduct an incentivized lab-in-the-field experiment,
which provides us with additional variation (relative to cross-section survey anal-
ysis) to power our empirical analysis. In addition, our experimental setup, while
hypothetical, allow us to compare what would have happened to willingness to mi-
grate illegally from a specific scenario to another.
Understanding the determinants of the willingness to migrate may have impor-
tant consequences on economic development. Batista et al. (2012a), for example,
show that the probability of own future migration has important positive effects
on educational attainment in Cape Verde – even on those individuals that end up
not actually emigrating. The evidence suggests that a 10 pp increase in the prob-
ability of own future migration increases the probability of completing intermedi-
ate secondary education by 4 pp for individuals who do not migrate. Additionally,
Docquier et al. (2014) show a strong correlation between the intention to migrate and
subsequent actual migration. The evidence from the follow up survey we conducted
one year after the experiment is in line with this finding, in that both actual migra-
tion decisions and intentions correlate well to the lab migration decisions taken one
year earlier.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the country
context in which we conduct our analysis. Section 3 discusses the survey and sam-
pling framework, the lab-in-the field experiment, and descriptive statistics. Section
4 presents the econometric approach and main empirical results. Section 5 presents
some robustness checks using follow up data on actual migration decisions and in-
tentions measured one year after the lab experiment. Section 5 offers concluding
remarks.
2.2 Country Context
Sandwiched by Senegal, The Gambia is the smallest country in mainland Africa with
a population of 2 million people. The country has an estimated GDP per capita of
$1700 ranking 176 out of 190 countries, making it one of the poorest countries in the
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world. Over the last decade, the country registered an average growth rate of 2.8
percent per year with a high debt of 123 percent of GDP in 2017 (World Bank, 2018).
Since independence in 1965, the country has had three presidents: Dawda Jawara
(1965-1994), Yaya Jammeh (1994-2016), and Adama Barrow from 2016 to date. Jam-
meh ousted Jawara through a bloodless coup. In December 2016, Jammeh’s 22-year
rule ended with Barrow’s electoral victory making it the first democratic transition
ever witnessed by the country.
Migration is an important phenomenon in The Gambia. The country attracts im-
migrants mostly from the sub region with Senegal dominating the flows. According
to the 2013 census, immigrants constitute 5 percent of the population, while rural
to urban migrants account for 7 percent. Additionally, emigration is a cornerstone
aspect of the Gambian economy with remittances amounting to almost 20 percent
of GDP (Ratha, 2016), which is equivalent to the whole contribution of the tourism
sector to GDP.
Europe remains the main destination for many Gambians, who mostly migrate
illegally (“Backway” as commonly called in The Gambia). In the early 2000s, many
Africans embark on migration to Spain through Senegal and Mauritania. This route
reached peak in 2006 during which more than 30,000 arrived in the Canary Islands
with an estimated dead of 6000 migrants. In 2007, following bilateral agreements be-
tween Senegal, Mauritania, and Spain, arrivals through the route continue to plum-
met. Another route utilized by many is the western Mediterranean route (Morocco-
Spain). The route attracted media attention when hundreds of migrants tried to scale
the border fence in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta.
Perhaps the current most famous illegal migration route in Gambia is the Libya
route, also known as the central Mediterranean route. Before the fall of the Gaddafi
regime, many African migrants opted for Libya as a destination country with many
job opportunities. However, the 2011 Libyan civil war crisis destabilized the re-
gion, subsequently making Libya as transit magnet for many economic migrants
and refugees. Presently, this route is the riskiest option for many African migrants.
Gambian economic migrants continue to utilize the western and central Mediter-
ranean route. This route mostly entails travelling from Gambia through Senegal,
Mali, Niger and from there to Libya. There is no visa requirement for Gambians to
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enter these countries with the exception of Libya. The smuggling starts from Niger
to Libya. In 2017, the latest year for which data are available, about 42,000 Gam-
bians arrived in Europe through the sea which represents about 2% of the country’s
total population, making Gambia the largest sender country of illegal migrants as a
percentage of total population.
The number of Gambian migrants crossing to Italy reached peak in 2016 with
more than 11,000 entries. However, this number has reduced to just more than 5000
in 2017 marking an almost 50 percent reduction (Frontex, 2016). This reduction is
perhaps due to the combined increase in the risk of migrating through Libya mak-
ing many attempting the Morocco - Spain route instead and change of government
in The Gambia. Before 2013, Spain served as the leading destination of Gambian
migrants with an estimated number of 22,000 (Kebbeh, 2013). However, the current
trends suggest that Gambians favor an initial transit to Italy, and subsequently to
Germany.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Survey and Sampling Framework
The survey data used in our work were collected using a representative sample of
584 households across 60 enumeration areas in the Upper River Region of the Gam-
bia. The enumeration areas were randomly chosen using population size propor-
tional sampling based on the Gambia 2013 census. In each enumeration area, a
random sample of 10 eligible households was drawn. Eligibility was determined
by asking whether there is young man with ages 16-25 belonging to the household.
If the household have more than one youth within the eligibility age category, one
would be randomly selected. In each of these households, after surveying the house-
hold head, the sampled young males were also surveyed.
The households were sampled using a simple random walk within each EA. Enu-
merators surveyed every nth household, where the nth household depended on the
size of the EA. Once they sampled the nth household, the participation criterion of
the household was ascertained by asking the household whether the household had
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at least one young man with ages between 16-25 years. Households that did not sat-
isfy this criterion were replaced by the geographically closest household to the right.
Following this sampling procedure, 595 households were finally surveyed. Out of
these households, a sample of 584 male youths were also surveyed, of which 406
participated in the experiment. Initially, enumerators were instructed to pick every
second household to participate in the experiment. However, this strategy was sub-
sequently discarded to allow one sampled young to participate in each household.
The fieldwork took place in May 2017.
2.3.2 Lab-in-the-field Experiment
The experiment was implemented as a simple lab-in-the field game in which partici-
pants were hypothetically endowed with 100,000 Gambia Dalasis (GMD)5. We frame
the participants’ decisions as migration decisions with a 10-year time horizon. The
precise framing of the experiment to players is provided in Appendix 2.A.2.
The experimental subjects must play 16 different rounds of an incentivized game
in where migration-related decisions must be made, depending on different combi-
nations of four different scenarios for the probability of dying en route to the mi-
gration destination and for the probability of obtaining legal residence status at the
destination.
The four scenarios in the games were 0, 10, 20, and 50 percent probability of dy-
ing in the migration route, and 0, 33, 50, and 100 percent probability of obtaining a
legal residence permit or asylum status at destination. These numbers were deter-
mined based on data from our pilot survey, and other official databases. According
to the International Organization for Migration (2017), 181,436 migrants arrived in
Italy through the sea while 4,581 migrants lost their life from January to December
2016. These figures provide a lower bound for the mortality rate at sea, estimated at
2.46% deaths of attempted migration journeys. In addition, we obtained the proba-
bility of dying en route by adding the probability of dying en route before reaching
the sea. The MHUB (2017) survey reports the incidences of cases where migrants
report dead bodies along the way (including the Sahara Desert, Libya, and Mediter-
ranean Sea). According to the data from the January 2017 survey, 44% of respondents
5Equivalent to 2,000 Euros (1 euro = GMD50 exchange rate)
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reported witnessing one or more dead in Libya, 38% in the Sahara, 15% in the Sea,
and 3% in transit countries such as Niger. Combining the probability of dying at
sea of 2.5% and the incidences of witnessing migrant deaths en route of 15%, we
estimated the overall probability of dying en route as 16.5%. In the experiment, we
use 20% as a proxy for the actual death rate over the migration route given the likely
undercount of fatalities. The 50% threshold for the probability of dying matches
expectation data from our pilot survey. Our pilot survey elicited the expected prob-
ability of dying from 20 young males of ages 16 to 25 years from the region of the
study. On average, the respondents expect that 5 out of 10 Gambians die along the
“Backway”, corresponding to a 50 percent probability of dying. In addition, this sur-
vey also reported the expected probability of obtaining a legal residence or asylum
status.
The official data on residence permits is obtained from the Asylum Information
Database (2017). This database contains detailed numbers of migrants by nationality
and by destination who applied for asylum and the final decision on the applica-
tions. In 2016, 8,930 migrants originating from the Gambia applied to asylum status
in Italy. The rejection rate for these migrants was 67.5%. Using this rejection rate, we
estimate at 33% the probability of obtaining asylum status or residence permit.
We therefore combined these two estimates (the first one based on existing data
and the second one based on expectation from the pilot data) and two other extreme
but interesting cases (0 and 10 percent chance of dying and 0 and 100 percent chance
of obtaining residence or asylum status) to obtain the rounds for the game. For
each round in the game, respondents were given showcards (shown in Figure 2.6)
visually illustrating probabilities of dying en route and of obtaining residence status.
Note that all rounds were framed as hypothetical scenarios and respondents were
not informed that one of the rounds included the actual risk of dying and chances of
obtaining residence/asylum permit.
Moreover, additional information on the corresponding wages was given. Specif-
ically, we assumed, based on a pilot survey conducted in Italy among Gambian
immigrants, that once migrants successfully reach Europe, they face two possible
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wages: a wage of 1000 Euros for those with legal residence status, and of 500 Eu-
ros for those without permit. This setting is consistent with the findings of Dust-
mann et al. (2017), who show that undocumented migrants consumed about 40%
less than documented migrants in Italy, and about one quarter of these differences
in consumption is due to undocumented migrants earning less than documented
migrants.
In each round, given the respective information provided verbally by the inter-
viewer and visually by the showcard given to the experimental subject, participants
had to make three decisions: (1) willingness to migrate, (2) willingness to pay for the
cost of migration using the endowment provided, and (3) willingness to be paid in
order to forgo migrating. The order of the 16 rounds was randomized.
Once the experimental subjects finished playing the game, their payoffs within
the game were determined by randomly selecting one of the rounds played. In the
selected round, the payout was made using the corresponding probabilities. The av-
erage payoff payment was GMD 100, the equivalent to the pay for two days’ work,
using our survey data. This relevant monetary pay and the framing script were in-
cluded in our design to incentivize experimental subjects to seriously consider the
decisions made in the game. Note that while the hypothetical wages are fixed across
rounds, the expected payoffs vary across rounds. For example, the expected payoff
in terms of wages in a round with 0 percent probability of dying and 0 percent proba-
bility of obtaining residence/asylum permit corresponds to 250 euros. Similarly, the
round with 0 percent probability of dying and a 100 percent probability of obtaining
residence/asylum permit corresponds to an expected monthly wage of 1000 euros.
The expected wage was not specifically indicated in each round; only hypothetical
endowment, wages, and the number of deaths and asylum permits granted per 10
migrants were showed.
2.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the data on the 406 sampled young males
who participated in the experiment. On average, the interviewed young is 20 years
old with a monthly income of GMD 2,061. In terms of formal education, 32% of the
young have some formal education with an average of 8 years of education. 38%
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of the respondents reported that they had already migrated outside their village for
more than 6 months. The duration of the migration spell averages 23 months. Al-
most all of the sampled young (82%) know at least one person (be it a relative, a
family member, or a friend) who has migrated outside their village (migration net-
work). On average the size of migration network is 2.8 per young. We also elicited
data on the number of migrants known by the respondent, that successfully trav-
elled to Europe through the “Backway” and also the number of people who died
along the way. The data indicates that on average, respondents know 11 persons
who successfully reached Europe through the “Backway” and an average of 3.7 per-
sons who lost their life en route to Europe.
TABLE 2.1: Summary Statistics: Sampled Participants in the Experi-
ment
Variable Mean Std. Dev. # of Obs.
Age 20.12 3.26 406
Formal education [Yes =1, No=0] 0.42 0.36 406
Years of formal education (if any) 8.17 2.35 172
Monthly income (GMD) 1696 3369 258
Has migrated before [Yes =1, No=0] 0.39 0.48 406
Duration of migration (if any) in months 21.75 24.14 159
Has relatives or friends abroad (migration network) [Yes =1, No=0] 0.76 0.42 406
No of relatives or friends (youth with migration network) 2.79 2.24 309
No of known successful migrants 9.88 11.74 406
No of known dead migrants en route 3.75 4.45 406
Has intention of migrating within the country [Yes =1, No=0] 0.81 0.39 406
Has intention of migrating outside the country [Yes =1, No=0] 0.92 0.26 406
Has intention of migrating illegally [Yes =1, No=0] 0.46 0.50 406
Top preferred destination (if intending to migrate illegally)
Italy 0.29 0.45 208
Germany 0.27 0.4 208
Spain 0.16 0.37 208
United States 0.06 0.25 208
United Kingdom 0.04 0.19 208
Willingness to forgo migrating (GMD) 26232 35770 208
Expected cost of migration (GMD) 79274 97414 208
Expected monthly wage in destination (EUR) 1338 1598 208
Expected probability of dying en route 0.48 0.25 406
Expected probability of obtaining a permit 0.38 0.28 406
Household characteristics
Household head age 50.03 15.39 406
Household size 10.52 7.29 406
Has internal migrants [Yes =1, No=0] 0.52 0.40 406
Has international migrants [Yes =1, No=0] 0.64 0.48 406
Has at least one illegal migrant [Yes=1, No=0] 0.43 0.49 260
Source: Authors calculations on the survey data.
Data on willingness or intention to migrate both internally and externally were
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elicited. To measure willingness to migrate, we asked the following question: Ide-
ally, if you have the opportunity, are you willing to migrate elsewhere inside the
Gambia? This question corresponds to intention or willingness to migrate internally.
For those who answered in the affirmative, a follow-up question of their preferred
destination was asked. The intention to migrate outside the Gambia was elicited in
a similar way. The results from the data indicate an overwhelming majority of 82%
willing to migrate within the Gambia while 91% of the respondents expressed a will-
ingness to migrate outside the Gambia. This indicates the fact that indeed a majority
of young males within the age category of 15 to 25 years desire to migrate and live
elsewhere, outside their current settlements. Similarly, to elicit willingness to mi-
grate illegally, we ask the following question: Ideally, if you have the opportunity,
are you willing to migrate through the “Backway” /Illegal way? We used the name
“Backway” as the illegal migration route is commonly known such in the Gambia.
Almost half of the sampled young (47%) responded in the affirmative. The top 5 in-
tended destinations are Italy (29%), Germany (27%), Spain (16%), the United States
of America (6%) and the United Kingdom (4%). These statistics are consistent with
the current top destination countries of migrants from the Gambia. In addition to
their intended destination, we collected information on expected cost of migrating,
expected monthly wages in destination country, and how much they were willing to
accept per month in order to forgo migrating. The average expected cost of migra-
tion amounts to GMD 85,394. In order to forgo migrating, respondents on average
are willing to accept GMD 28,370 (about 525 euros) per month. This indicates that
young males are willing to accept a substantial risk of dying en route instead of re-
ceiving a substantial amount compared to their current monthly earnings. This is
in line with their average expected wage of 1478 Euros per month in Europe, which
corresponds to more than GMD 70,000.
Furthermore, we elicited other expectations from the sampled young. Specifi-
cally, in addition to the expected cost of migrating, expected wage at destination
and willingness to forgo migrating illegally, we elicited the expected probability of
dying en route and the expected probability of obtaining a residence or asylum per-
mit. Expected probabilities were collected using the following simple questions: Out
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of every 10 Gambian migrants, how many people do you think die on the way mi-
grating to Europe through the “Backway”/illegal way? Out of every 10 Gambian
migrants, how many people do you think obtain residence or refugee status in Eu-
rope? The answers to these questions represent the expected probabilities of dying
en route and obtaining residence or asylum status. On average, respondents esti-
mate at respectively 49% and 40% the probability of dying en route and of obtaining
a permit. According to current estimates, the probability of dying is 20% while the
probability of obtaining a permit is 33%, indicating that young on average overesti-
mate the risk of dying en route while underestimating the probability of obtaining
residence status.
Furthermore, we elicited time and risk preferences. Respondents were asked
how much they are willing to invest in lottery with 50% chance of doubling their
investment and 50% chance of loosing half of the investment out of a D1000 hypo-
thetical endowment. The percentage of the endowment they were willing to invest
in the lottery is our proxy for risk preference. On average, respondents were willing
to invest 38% of the D1000 endowment. Similarly, to elicit time preference, we asked
respondents suppose that we won D100,000 in a lottery, and they could choose ei-
ther to wait for one year to be paid the full amount, or pay to receive the amount
immediately. Using this information, the discount factor can be calculated as one
minus the fraction they are willing to pay to receive the money immediately. The
average discount factor is 0.90. See the appendix for the exact framing of the risk
and time preference.
Who are those young willing to migrate illegally and who are those young not
willing to migrate? Table 2.2 provides brief summary statistics on these groups of
people. Out of the 406 sampled young, 380 (91%) express willingness to migrate
outside the country, while the remaining 63 have no intention to migrate. Though
the data suggest that more than 90% of the respondents aspire to migrate outside
the country, however, a fewer fraction (46%) are willing to migrate illegally. This
raw statistic is consistent with Mbaye (2014). Aspiring illegal migrants are relatively
younger, with an average age of 19.92 years compared to 20.28 years for those not
willing to migrate illegally. Those that are willing to migrate have 8.46 years of
education compared to 8.56 for those not willing to migrate illegally. In addition,
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the former earn an average monthly income of GMD 1,517 compared to an average
of GMD 2,130.21 for the latter. While the share of individuals with past migration
experience is the same in both groups, (38%) potential illegal migrants have more
migration experience in terms of number of months than those unwilling to migrate
illegally (24.8 versus 21.6 months). In addition, both groups share the same fraction
(82%) of having migration network, however, those willing to migrate illegally has
larger average network of 3.01 persons versus 2.76 migrants for those not willing
to migrate. Furthermore, potential illegal migrants know on average more people
who successfully migrated illegally (11.6) compared to those not willing to migrate
illegally (8.3). Comparing the number of people known by the two groups that lost
their lives en route, we observe those who are not willing to migrate illegally know
more people who lost their lives en route to Europe compared to potential illegal mi-
grants (3.83 versus 3.67). The expected probability of dying en route for those willing
to migrate averages 45% compared to 53% for non-potential illegal migrants. This
implies that while both groups expect a higher probability of dying compared to the
actual estimated probability (20%), however those willing to migrate expect lower
risk of dying. Finally, potential illegal migrants expect a higher chance of obtaining
residence status of 47% versus 33% for those not willing to migrate illegally. Finally,
those willing to migrate illegally on average willing to invest 44% of their hypothet-
ical endowment versus 32% for those not willing to migrate implying that they are
less risk averse.
2.4 Econometric approach and main empirical results
2.4.1 Estimation strategy
In order to analyze how the probability of successfully reaching Italy and the proba-
bility of obtaining a legal residence permit affect migration related outcomes such as
the willingness to migrate, the willingness to pay for migration, and the willingness
to receive to forgo migrating, we can estimate the following model:
Oir = α+ β1PDir + β2PPir + δi + θr + eir (2.1)
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TABLE 2.2: Summary Statistics: Statistical Differences
Willing to migrate Not willing to migrate Test of
Illegally Illegally Differences
N=189 N=226 N=406
VARIABLES Mean SD Mean SD P-Value
Individual characteristics
Age 19.86 3.23 20.40 3.27 0.0875
Years of formal education (if any) 8.18 2.33 8.18 2.37 0.9929
Monthly income (GMD) 1516 3118 2130 3448 0.0827
Has migrated before [Yes =1, No=0] 0.38 0.48 0.38 0.48 0.9951
Duration of migration (in months) 24.77 29.89 21.56 17.56 0.3365
Has relatives or friends abroad
(migration network) [Yes =1, No=0] 0.77 0.41 0.75 0.43 0.5658
No of migration network 2.17 1.44 2.00 1.13 0.3164
No of known successful migrants 11.69 12.94 8.52 11.64 0.0086
No of known dead migrants en route 3.77 4.91 4.55 3.57 0.1482
Expected probability
of dying en route 0.43 0.24 0.53 0.25 0.0002
Expected probability
of obtaining a permit 0.46 0.29 0.29 0.25 0.0000
Household Characteristics
Household head age 52.81 15.73 50.31 14.78 0.1323
Household size 10.14 6.4 9.94 6.9 0.7518
Has internal migrants [Yes =1, No=0] 0.60 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.7307
Has international migrants [Yes =1, No=0] 0.70 0.45 0.60 0.49 0.0213
Received remittances [Yes =1, No=0] 0.36 0.48 0.31 0.46 0.3014
Source: Authors calculations on the survey data.
where O denotes our three outcomes of interest: willingness to migrate, to pay, and
to forgo migrating. PD is the probability of dying en route an PP is probability of
obtaining a permit. δi is individual fixed effects and θr is round fixed effects. Our
estimates of interest are β1 and β2. β1 gives us the effect of probability of success
on the three outcomes. While β2 gives us the effect of probability of obtaining a
residence permit on our outcome of interest. The advantage of our design is that
due to the two variations of both within individuals and across individuals, we can
include individual fixed effects which will allow us control for potential omitted
variables.
2.4.2 Empirical Results
Main Results: Willingness to Migrate Illegally
Table 3 below shows the regression results from the lab-in-the field experiment. Re-
spondents were given different hypothetical information on the probability of dying
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en route, the probability of obtaining residence permit and wages in destination
country and given this hypothetical information, they made hypothetical decisions
to migrate illegally or not. Thus, the dependent variable is whether individuals are
willing to migrate illegally or not. We are interested in understanding how differ-
ent factors affect the decisions to migrate illegally or not with special interest in the
probabilities of dying en route and of obtaining asylum or residence permit.
We present results from a linear probability model with various specifications.
Irrespective of the specifications, we observe that increasing the probability of dying
en route reduces the probability of individuals’ willingness to migrate. The coef-
ficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, the chance of
obtaining residence or asylum permit is positively correlated with the odds of mi-
grating. This implies that potential migrants care about the likelihood of obtaining
asylum status once they reach Europe. Columns (1) and (3) provide parsimonious
correlations, while columns (2) and (4) estimate the model by including individual
and round order fixed effects.
TABLE 2.3: Willingness to Migrate Illegally - Results from the Exper-
iment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrate Migrate Migrate Migrate
VARIABLES Illegally Illegally Illegally Illegally
Prob. of permit 0.1894*** 0.1301*** 0.4936*** 0.4181***
(0.0240) (0.0165) (0.0445) (0.0384)
Prob. of dying -0.1561*** -0.1175*** -0.3545*** -0.3789***
(0.0441) (0.0253) (0.0998) (0.0393)
Constant 0.3609*** 0.34991*** 0.4638*** 0.3951***
(0.0244) (0.0072) (0.0427) (0.0211)
Individual Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Round Order Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
N 6478 6478 2259 2527
n 406 406 115 115
R-squared 0.0236 0.8200 0.1667 0.5462
Source: Authors calculations on the survey data.
Notes: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Migrate illegally is a
binary variable taking value 1 if the respondent is willing to migrate illegally and 0 oth-
erwise. Prob. of permit is the hypothetical probability of obtaining a residence permit
(or asylum status) in Italy. Prob. of dying is the hypothetical probability of dying en
route to Italy. N represents the total number of observations and n is the total number of
respondents. Each individual has a maximum of 16 observations. In columns (3) and (4),
estimation is conducted by dropping those who are willing to migrate in all rounds (102)
and those that are not willing to migrate in any round (189). Estimates obtained using a
linear probability model. Standard errors in the parentheses, clustered at the individual
level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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In column (1) of Table 2.3, the results show that a 1 percent increase in the proba-
bility of obtaining a residence permit increases the willingness to migrate by 0.19 pp
highlighting that potential migrants care about the likelihood of obtaining residence
permit once they reach Europe. Similarly, increasing the hypothetical mortality rate
by 1 percent reduces the willingness to migrate illegally by 0.16pp. Once we con-
trol for both individual and round order fixed effects in column 2, the magnitude
of effect reduces to 0.13 percent for the residence permit effect and 0.12 percent for
the mortality effect. Note that this magnitude is very similar to the 0.15pp mortality
effect estimated by Shrestha (2017a) in Nepal.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.3, we restrict the sample by dropping respon-
dents who do not to migrate and those who always migrate irrespective of the round.
The resulting estimates double in magnitude. The coefficient on the legal permit in-
creases to 0.42 pp, while the mortality effect also increases to 0.38 pp. The experimen-
tal setup allows us to evaluate changes in the willingness to migrate if potential mi-
grants had accurate information about the chances of dying en route and obtaining
residence permit. Table 2.4 presents results comparing the willingness to migrate of
experimental subjects, when moving from their current expectations on migration
risks to different probabilities of dying en route and of obtaining legal residence sta-
tus. Column (1) of Table 2.4 shows that the expected 50 percent probability of dying
en route and 50 percent probability of obtaining residence permit corresponds to 37
percent of all experimental subjects being willing to migrate, and 47 percent when
including only the experimental subjects in the responsive sub-sample.
As is reported in column (1) of Table 2.4, we find that reducing the probability
of dying to 0 percent increases the likelihood of migrating by 6.5 pp and increasing
the increasing the probability of obtaining permit to 100 percent increases migration
by 3.7 pp.
Recall that (based on the official numbers described above) the actual probability
of dying en route is 20 percent and the probability of obtaining a legal residence per-
mit is 30 percent. Our results suggest that knowing the probability of dying en route
to be 20 percent instead of the average 50 percent expectation increases migration
by 2.3 pp. Similarly, adjusting the probability of obtaining residence permit from
50 percent to 30 percent reduces migration by 2.9 pp. The difference between these
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coefficients is statistically different at the 1% significance level.
Column (2) in Table 2.4 shows that the willingness to migrate of responsive ex-
perimental subjects is reduced by 9.4pp when moving from the 50 percent expected
probability to the actual 30 percent probability of obtaining a permit. In the same
way, we observe that the willingness to migrate increases by 7pp when the proba-
bility of dying en route changes from the expected probability of 50 percent to the
20 percent actual probability of dying en route. The difference between these coeffi-
cients is also statistically different.
TABLE 2.4: Willingness to Migrate Illegally - Results from the Exper-
iment
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Migrate Illegally Migrate Illegally
0% Prob. of permit -0.0985*** -0.3154***
(0.0139) (0.0370)
30% Prob. of permit -0.0288** -0.0935**
(0.0092) (0.0292)
100% Prob. of permit 0.0370*** 0.1196***
(0.0093) (0.0276)
0% Prob. of dying 0.0648*** 0.2097***
(0.0129) (0.0368)
10% Prob. of dying 0.0353*** 0.1101***
(0.0102) (0.0322)
20% Prob. of dying 0.0229** 0.0709**
(0.0115) (0.0300)
Constant 0.3745*** 0.4742***
(0.0154) (0.4742)
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Round Order Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 6478 1835
n 406 115
R-squared 0.8219 0.8157
Source: Authors calculations on the survey data
Notes: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Migrate
illegally is a binary variable taking value 1 if the respondent is willing to
migrate illegally and 0 otherwise. Prob. of permit is the hypothetical prob-
ability of obtaining a residence permit (or asylum status) in Italy. Prob. of
dying is the hypothetical probability of dying en route to Italy. N represents
the total number of observations and n is the total number of respondents.
Each individual has a maximum of 16 observations. The omitted category
corresponds to the average expected probabilities of dying en route (50%)
and of obtaining a permit (50%). In column (2), estimation is conducted by
dropping those who are willing to migrate in all rounds (102) and those that
are not willing to migrate in any round (189). Standard errors in the paren-
theses, clustered at the individual level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at
5%; ***significant at 1%.
Table 2.5 describes predictors of the experimental subjects’ responsiveness (in
terms of migration decisions) to the information provided in the various rounds of
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the lab experiment. Column (1) in Table 2.5 describes how individuals who choose
to never migrate in any of the experimental rounds are less likely to know current
emigrants, and more likely to know past migrants who died en route to Europe.
They tend to have relatively low expectations regarding the probability of obtain-
ing a residence permit and expect that the probability of dying en route is relatively
high. They are substantially more risk averse than those individuals who migrate in
at least some of the experimental rounds. Column (2) shows a different story for ex-
perimental subjects who responded to the varying information provided across the
different experimental rounds: these responsive subjects know few past migrants
who died in route to Europe, and had relatively high expectations regarding the
probability of obtaining a legal residence permit. Finally, column (3) of Table 2.5
showed that subjects who do not respond to the information provided in the dif-
ferent experimental rounds because they always chose to migrate tend to have a
relatively low expectation about the probability of dying en route.
TABLE 2.5: Predictors of Experimental Subjects’ Responsiveness to
Information Provided in the Lab Experiment
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Never Migrate Migrate Sometimes Migrate Always
No of known migrants -0.0064*** 0.0030 0.0034
(0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0023)
No of known dead migrants 0.0107* -0.0179*** 0.0073
(0.0054) (0.0039) (0.0057)
Expected permit -0.0490*** 0.0495*** -0.0005
(0.0079) (0.0088) (0.0081)
Expected dead 0.0252** -0.0065 -0.0187*
(0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0083)
Risk preference -0.2848*** 0.1781* 0.1067
(0.0816) (0.0813) (0.0737)
Constant 0.5120*** 0.0555 0.4325**
(0.1449) (0.1356) (0.1447)
N 359 359 359
R-squared 0.2032 0.1595 0.0510
Source: Authors calculations on the survey data
Notes: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Never migrate is binary variable
taking value 1 if respondent is not willing to migrate in all rounds and 0 otherwise. Migrate some-
times is binary variable taking value1 if respondent expressed willingness to migrate in some rounds
and 0 otherwise. Migrate always is binary variable taking value 1 if respondent is willing to migrate
in all rounds and 0 otherwise. No of known migrants is the number of known migrants who mi-
grated, no of known dead migrants is the number of known “backway” migrants who died en route
to Italy. Expected permit is the expected probability of obtaining a residence/asylum permit. Ex-
pected dead is the expected probability of dying en route to Italy. Risk preference is measured as
willingness to take a gamble (see appendix for the precise question). Robust standard errors in the
parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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Heterogeneous effects: expectations
One alternative interpretation of the migration choices made by potential migrants
in our lab experiment is that they do not necessarily reflect migration decisions, and
they can instead simply translate the experimental subjects’ preferences for risky
behavior. The implication would be that lab decisions would perhaps be similar if
framed in a different context, such as tobacco use or gambling. In this section, we
examine the robustness of our main empirical findings by presenting how experi-
mental migration decisions vary with expectations about the probability of dying
during the illegal migration journey, as well as expectations about the probability
of acquiring legal status after successful arrival to Europe. These results show how
these migration-related expectations are significantly linked to the experimental mi-
gration decisions made.
Results in Table 2.6 and 2.7 illustrate how, in addition to the expected effects of
the probabilities of dying en route and of obtaining a legal residence permit, over-
expectation of both of these probabilities also gives rise to the expected effects: over-
estimating the probability of obtaining a legal permit after arrival in Europe has a
positive significant effect on the probability of migration, whereas overestimating
the probability of dying en route to Europe has a significant negative effect on the
decisions to migrate.
Panel 2 of Table 2.6 further shows that for those who overestimate the probability
of obtaining a legal permit, the impact of additional increases in the probability of a
permit will have a positive significant effect, but lower than the impact on those who
underestimate this probability. In this same instance where subjects overestimate the
probability of a permit, an increase in the probability of dying en route seems to have
a negative effects, but this cannot be statistically distinguished from the effect of this
probability on those who underestimate the probability of obtaining a permit.
Similarly, in Table 2.7, we observe that for those overestimating the probability of
dying en route, the marginal effects of increased probabilities of obtaining a permit
and of dying en route have the expected signs but cannot be distinguished from
the effect of those probabilities on the subjects who underestimate the probability of
dying.
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TABLE 2.6: Heterogeneous Effects Based on Expected Permit
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Migrate Illegally Migrate Illegally
Prob. of permit 0.1172*** 0.0890***
(0.0237) (0.0182)
Prob. of dying -0.1055*** -0.0708***
(0.0364) (0.0221)
Overestimate prob. of permit 0.1425***
(0.0451)
Overestimate prob. of permit × Prob. of permit 0.0774** 0.0883***
(0.0360) (0.0305)
Overestimate prob. of permit × Prob. of dying -0.0734 -0.1027**
(0.0582) (0.0412)
Constant 0.2972*** 0.3722***
(0.0305) (0.0068)
Individual Fixed Effects No Yes
Round Order Fixed Effects No Yes
N 6478 6478
n 406 406
R-squared 0.0262 0.8237
Source: Authors calculations on the survey data
Notes: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Migrate illegally is a
binary variable taking value 1 if the respondent is willing to migrate illegally and 0 oth-
erwise. Prob. of permit is the hypothetical probability of obtaining a residence permit (or
asylum status) in Italy. Prob. of dying is the hypothetical probability of dying en route
to Italy. Overestimate probability of permit corresponds to subjects with an expectation
above the actual probability of obtaining a legal residence permit (30 percent). Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at
5%; ***significant at 1%.
Are experimental subjects behaving rationally?
A final check on the robustness of our findings is to evaluate whether experimental
decisions to migrate are rational in the sense of net income maximizing.
According to the neoclassical theory of migration initially put forward by Sjaas-
tad (1962), the decision to migrate is governed by utility maximization based on
expected net income flows. Individuals migrate if their expected net income from
migration is positive. Using our experimental setup, we can compute the expected
net income of migrating illegally. Our experimental set up assumes that individuals
face two types of wages; 1000 euros of monthly wage for those who have a legal
residence permit, and 500 euros for those without permit. To compute the expected
benefit of migrating, for each round, we employed the respective probabilities of dy-
ing and chances of obtaining permit applied in each round. Similarly, we compute
the expected benefit of staying in Gambia. We assume that individuals who chose to
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TABLE 2.7: Heterogeneous Effects Based on Expected Dead
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Migrate Illegally Migrate Illegally
Prob. of permit 0.1296*** 0.0980***
(0.0376) (0.0273)
Prob. of dying -0.1288* -0.1382**
(0.0656) (0.0544)
Overestimate prob. of dying -0.1330**
(0.0598)
Overestimate prob. of dying × Prob. of permit 0.0343 0.0414
(0.0427) (0.0325)
Overestimate prob. of dying × Prob. of dying -0.0110 0.0232
(0.0730) (0.0585)
Constant 0.4718*** 0.3724***
(0.0544) (0.0067)
Individual Fixed Effects No Yes
Round Order Fixed Effects No Yes
N 6478 6478
n 406 406
R-squared 0.0452 0.8225
Source: Authors calculations on the survey data
Notes: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Migrate illegally is a
binary variable taking value 1 if the respondent is willing to migrate illegally and 0 oth-
erwise. Prob. of permit is the hypothetical probability of obtaining a residence permit (or
asylum status) in Italy. Prob. of dying is the hypothetical probability of dying en route
to Italy. Overestimate probability of dying corresponds to subjects with an expectation
above the actual probability of dying en route (20 percent). Standard errors in parenthe-
ses, clustered at the individual level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant
at 1%.
stay in the country are faced with the existing labor market outcomes and earn their
reported salary or the average national monthly salary of those who live in rural
Gambia. Since those who stay within the country are also faced with a non-trivial
risk of dying (0.35 percent, Gambia Bureau of Statistics (2013)), though negligible
compared to the risk of dying en route, we employed this fatality rate to compute
the benefit of staying put. Additionally, for computational purposes, we assume the
cost of migration to be 2000 euros, the gain from dying en route or dying in the coun-
try corresponds to zero payoff, and the migration period lasts for 10 years. Finally,
for discounting purpose, we utilized the average lending rate of 22.63% published
by the central bank at the time of the survey (May 2017).
The computation exercise yields an average net present gain of migration of 29,
311 euros if we assume the reported monthly salary of our respondents; 29,185 eu-
ros assuming the average monthly salary of GMD 2000; and 28,027 euros when we
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utilize the national monthly average of GMD.
How does this affect experimental subjects’ decisions to migrate illegally? In
order words, are respondents behaving rationally, i.e., are respondents choosing to
migrate when the net grain of migrating is positive? The descriptive results sug-
gest that the respondents are indeed behaving rationally, in that all the 38 cases with
negative net gain of migrating, only one case responded willing to migrate illegally
(2 percent). When we analyze the cases in which the expected net gain of migra-
tion was positive, we observe a 41 percent rate of willingness to migrate illegally.
Table 2.8 below shows the impact of the net gain of migration on the willingness
to migrate. Depending on our assumption on computing the benefit of staying in
the country, we observe for every 1 percent increase in the expected net gain of mi-
gration, an increase in the willingness to migrate of about 11 percent. It is worth
highlighting that our assumption of zero payoff for the dead outcome renders our
estimated net gain of migration as an upper bound.
TABLE 2.8: Willingness to Migrate Illegally and Expected Net Gain of
Migration
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Migrate Illegally Migrate Illegally Migrate Illegally
ln(NPV1) 0.1130***
(0.0160)
ln(NPV2) 0.1144***
(0.0125)
ln(NPV3) 0.1083***
(0.0118)
Constant -0.7366*** -0.7728*** -0.7050***
(0.1643) (0.1282) (0.1209)
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Round Order Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 4421 6478 6478
n 248 406 406
R-squared 0.8219 0.8157 0.8215
Source: Authors calculations on the survey data
Notes: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Migrate illegally is
a binary variable taking value 1 if the respondent is willing to migrate illegally and 0
otherwise. NPV1 is estimated using the individual reported monthly wage, NPV2 is
done with the average monthly wage of GMD 2000, and NPV3 uses the national aver-
age monthly wage rate of GMD 3000. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the
individual level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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2.4.3 Willingness to pay to migrate and willingness to receive to forgo
migration
As a final robustness check, we examine how the probabilities of dying en route
and of obtaining a legal permit to stay in Europe affect the willingness to pay for
illegal migration (though smugglers) and the willingness to receive a payment to
forgo migrating illegally. Recall that in the experiment, subjects were hypothetically
endowed with D 100,000 of which they can choose how much they are willing to
pay in order to finance migration costs. The measures we use are obtained through
this hypothetical, non-incentivized, experiment.
Column (1) of Table 2.9 describes how the risk of dying en route and the chances
of obtaining a residence permit affect the willingness to pay for illegal migration
costs and the opportunity cost of migrating. These results show that the hypotheti-
cal probabilities of dying en route have negative but insignificant effects on the will-
ingness to pay for migration cost. However, the probability of obtaining a residence
permit has a positive and significant effect on the amount potential migrants are
willing to pay for the migration cost. A one percent increase in the chance of obtain-
ing a permit increases the willingness to pay for migration by 5.6 pp. Furthermore,
in column (2) of Table 2.9, we observe that both the risk of dying and chances of
obtaining residence permit affect the opportunity cost of migrating. The elasticities
suggest that for every one percent increase in the risk of dying, willingness to re-
ceive in order to forgo migration reduces by 9 pp. Similarly, respondents are willing
to accept to 6 percent more for every one percent increase in the chances of obtaining
residence permit.
2.4.4 Do lab migration decisions reflect actual migration decisions?
An alternative interpretation of the migration choices made by experimental subjects
in our lab experiment is that they may not translate into actual migration decisions.
To check the robustness of our findings relative to this concern, we collected follow-
up data via telephone calls. As is described in Table 2.10, the research team managed
to re-contact 263 out of the initial 406 experimental subjects that participated in the
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TABLE 2.9: Regression Results from Experiment - Willingness to Pay
and Receive
(1) (2)
VARIABLES log(Willingness to Pay) log(Forgo Migration)
Probability of obtaining a residence permit 0.0566** 0.0627*
(0.0388) (0.0354)
Probability of dying en route -0.0001 -0.0903*
(0.0559) (0.0517)
Constant 10.7625*** 9.5828***
(0.0148) (0.0154)
Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Round Order Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 2,733 2,731
n 205 205
R-squared 0.7352 0.9330
Source: Authors calculations on the survey data
Notes: Regressions estimated using OLS. Willingness to pay for migration is the hypothetical
amount (in GMD) respondents are willing to pay for the cost of migrating illegally. Compen-
sation to forgo migration is the amount (in GMD) per month respondents are willing to accept
in order to forgo migrating illegally. N represents the total number of observations and n is the
total number of respondents. Each individual has a maximum of 16 observations. Standard
errors in the parentheses, clustered at the individual level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at
5%; ***significant at 1%.
lab experiment. This large attrition rate may mask the occurrence of more interna-
tional migration than we could measure in the follow-up survey, as it is particularly
difficult to track illegal migrants to Europe, even though the research team tried to
contact these experimental subjects via social media, in addition to telephone con-
tacts.
Of those we could re-interview, 22% had actually migrated, although only 3%
had migrated internationally – and mostly to Senegal. In terms of intentions to mi-
grate, 77% of re-interviewed experimental subjects intended to migrate in the future,
although only 33% in the following year, and also 33% expressed an intention to em-
igrate illegally.
The actual decisions and intentions to migrate correlate very significantly with
the experimental migration decisions, although the magnitude of this correlation is
small. As displayed in Table 2.11, reporting experimentally to migrate is associ-
ated with an increase by 1.75pp in the probability of actual migration, and with an
increase of 10.8pp in the intention to migrate illegally.
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TABLE 2.10: Descriptive Statistics from Follow-up Survey
VARIABLES N Mean SD Min Max
Migrated 263 0.2243 0.4179 0 1
Migrated internally 263 0.1901 0.4007 0 1
Migrated internationally 263 0.0304 0.2016 0 1
Migrated to Senegal 263 0.0342 0.1910 0 1
Intent to migrate 248 0.7661 0.4241 0 1
Intent to migrate next year 248 0.3266 0.4699 0 1
Intent to migrate illegally 248 0.3306 0.4718 0 1
Source: Follow-up survey and own calculations.
Notes: Migrated is a binary variable taking value 1 if the respon-
dent migrated and 0 otherwise. Migrated internally takes value 1 if
respondent migrated within the country and 0 otherwise. Migrated
internationally takes value 1 if the respondent migrated outside the
country and 0 otherwise. Intent to migrate takes value 1 if the re-
spondent is willing to migrate.
TABLE 2.11: Lab Willingness to Migrate Illegally and Follow-up Ac-
tual Migration Decisions and Intentions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrated Intent Intent to Migrate Intent to
internationally to migrate next year migrate illegally
Lab Willingness to Migrate 0.0213*** 0.0392*** 0.0704*** 0.1071***
(0.0073) (0.0136) (0.0154) (0.0155)
Constant 0.0336** 0.7550*** 0.3010*** 0.2913***
(0.0144) (0.0275) (0.0306) (0.0309)
Round order fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3356 3912 3912 3912
n 243 243 243 243
R2 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.012
Source: Authors calculations on the follow-up survey data
Notes: Regressions estimated using a Linear Probability Model. Lab willingness to migrate is bi-
nary variable taking value 1 if respondent is willing to migrate illegally in the lab-in-the-field ex-
periment, and 0 otherwise. N represents total number of observations and n is the total number of
respondents. Each individual has maximum of 16 observations. Standard errors in the parentheses,
clustered at the individual level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
2.5 Conclusion
This study aims at improving our understanding of the determinants of the willing-
ness to migrate illegally from West Africa to Europe. To this end, we implemented
an incentivized lab-in-the field experiment using a sample of 406 households in ru-
ral Gambia, a country with the largest intensity (as percent of population) of illegal
migration to Europe. In the incentivized experiment, subjects faced scenarios with
differing probabilities of successfully reaching Europe, and of obtaining asylum or
other residence status that will allow them to travel and work legally upon arrival.
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In each scenario, respondents made choices on whether to migrate illegally, on their
willingness to pay for migration, and on the amount, they were willing to accept in
order to forgo migrating.
Our results suggest that potential migrants overestimate the risk of dying en
route to Europe, and the probability of obtaining legal residency status. Moreover,
on average, we found evidence of youth willing to reject a substantial amount of
money per month than forgo migrating illegally. Our findings suggest that the will-
ingness to migrate illegally is not only driven by the risk of dying en route, but also
by the chances of obtaining asylum or a legal residence permit. Additional evidence
also shows that prior expectations may act as important determinants of the will-
ingness to migrate illegally. Overall, our study suggests that the migration decisions
of potential migrants actively respond to information about relevant facts regarding
costs and benefits of migration.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Flows of Illegal Migrants into Europe
FIGURE 2.1: Total Flow of Migrants Crossing the Central Mediter-
ranean Route (2009-2017)
FIGURE 2.2: Total Flow of Migrants Crossing the Central Mediter-
ranean Route by Top 10 countries of origin (2009-2017)
2.A.2 Lab-in-the-Field Experiment Framing
Imagine that you have/given 100,000 Gambian Dalasis. You can decide what to
do with the money. You can either keep it or use it migrate to Europe through the
“Backway”. Now I will give you 16 different scenarios, and for each scenario, you
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FIGURE 2.3: Total Flow of Migrants as a Percentage of Origin Pop-
ulation Crossing the Central Mediterranean Route in 2017 by Top 10
countries of origin
FIGURE 2.4: Total Flow of Gambian Migrants Crossing the Central
Mediterranean and Western Mediterranean Routes (2009-2017)
will decide whether you will migrate or not, how much you are willing to pay for
migration cost, and how much you are willing to accept in order to stop migrating.
In this game, depending on what you choose to do, you stand the chance to win real
money at the end of the game.
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FIGURE 2.5: Total Flow of Gambian Migrants by Routes (2009-2017)
For every 20000 Euros (D1,000,000) you win, we will pay you 1-real euro (D50).
You have the opportunity to win a minimum of D5 up to a maximum of D300.
For example, people who choose not to migrate can keep the gift of D100,000
which is equivalent to a payoff of D5. While those who choose to migrate can ei-
ther win D0 if they die along the way, D150 if they reach but do not obtain a per-
mit/asylum. And finally those who migrate and obtain a permit wins D300.
Before playing the game, as you may know, migration to Europe while profitable
can also be risky. The rules of the game are as follows: If you choose to migrate, you
can either successfully reach to Europe or you will die along the way. This depends
on the chances we will be providing. All those who successfully reach in Europe,
some will have residence permit/asylum papers, while others will not. Those who
obtain the permit have the opportunity to earn more money compared to those who
do not. Moreover, the people who obtain the permit will also have the opportunity
to come visit their family back in Africa.
At the end of the game, we will randomly choose one scenario from the sixteen
scenarios to pay you. The case that we choose will determine how much you will
earn; therefore we advise that you take each decision equally seriously. We will play
the chances of dying en route and the chances of obtaining a residence permit for
that chosen round.
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2.A.3 Show Cards
FIGURE 2.6: Show Cards
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Chapter 3
Polygamy, Sibling Rivalry and
Migration
Abstract1
This paper examines the relationship between polygamous family structure and in-
ternational migration. We use data from a rich representative household survey and
population censuses from Mali, a country with a long history of international mi-
gration and a high polygamy rate to estimate the impact of the polygynous status
of mothers on their children migration decisions. We find a positive and statistical
significant effect of polygyny status of mothers on children migration decisions. We
provide additional evidence supporting the idea that the effect is due to sibling ri-
valry: having migrant siblings increases the likelihood of migrating. Our evidence
suggests that co-wives’ rivalry as documented elsewhere trickles down to children
rivalry in migration. Our overall results suggest that, in addition to economic rea-
sons, international migration is also driven by social reasons.
Keywords: Polygamy; Sibling rivalry; International migration; Mali.
JEL Codes: F22, J12, J13, O15, O55.
1This chapter is co-authored with Flore Gubert. We are grateful to Anne-Sophie Robilliard, Pauline
Rossi, Pedro Portugal, Sylvie Lambert, Yanos Zylberberg, and Zaki Wahhaj for helpful comments and
suggestions. The first author acknowledges the European Doctorate Degree in Economics - Erasmus
Mundus (EDE-EM) Program for funding and support.
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3.1 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed a growing flow of human mobility both internally
and internationally. The estimated number of international migrants reached 244
million (United Nations, 2016) and stock of internal migrants are estimated at 780
million people (UNDP, 2009). The increase in human mobility has led a greater in-
terest in especially why people migrate. The macro evidence determinants of inter-
national migration flows2 include income per capita (Ortega and Peri, 2009), wage
differentials (Grogger and Hanson, 2011), geographic distance (Mayda, 2010), cul-
tural distance (White and Buehler, 2018), diasporas or migration networks (Beine et
al., 2011), and immigration policy (Ortega and Peri, 2013). At the micro (individual
or household) level, the drivers of migration include earning differentials (Kennan
and Walker, 2011; Bertoli et al., 2013), expected remittances (Chort and Senne, 2015;
Chort and Senne, 2018), risk and patience preferences (Gibson and McKenzie, 2009),
and sibling migration (Stöhr, 2015).
While the previous contributions highlighted the role of the family in the migra-
tion decision, little do we know about the implications of the family structure itself
on individuals’ migration decisions. In many Sub-Saharan African countries, polyg-
yny3 is widely practiced even though it has declined overtime. According to some
recent estimates, about 25 percent of married women are in polygynous unions in
the whole region (Arthi and Fenske, 2018). Indeed, polygamy is associated with
low savings and economic growth (Tertilt, 2005), and low fertility rates of women
in polygynous marriages (Rossi, 2018) but an increase in aggregate fertility (Cahu
et al., 2014).
This paper aims at understanding how family structure, polygamy in particular,
affects the migration decisions of children raised in such settings. In particular, we
aim at answering the following questions: (1) Are children from polygynous house-
holds more likely to migrate? and (2) Is the underlining mechanism due to sibling
rivalry transmitted from co-wives’ rivalry? Answering these two questions is not an
2See Beine et al. (2016) for a recent review of evidence.
3The term refers to marriage with one husband and multiple wives. In this paper, we use polygyny
and polygamy (marriage practice with more than one wife (polygyny) or more than one husband
(polyandry)) interchangeably as polygyny is the one practiced in our setting.
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easy task. In addition to the usual identification problem, such investigation is ex-
tremely demanding in terms of data as we need to observe both the entire household
migration history and the detailed structure of the family including the biological
links between household members. Mali provides an ideal context to study these
questions as it characterized with a long history of international migration and a
high polygamy rate: 35 percent of mothers in our sample are in polygynous unions.
In this paper, we use data from the 2016 EMOP survey ("Enquête Modulaire et Per-
manente auprès des Ménage") conducted on a large sample of Malian households, that
we combine with the 1987 and 2009 Malian population censuses. In this edition of
the EMOP survey, great care was put on the identification of blood ties and marital
relationships between household members, and all male adults were asked about
their marital trajectory, so that men in a polygamous union can easily be identified
even if all their spouses are non-coresiding. To overcome the identification prob-
lem due to the endogeneity of the relationship between polygamy and migration,
we instrument the polygynous status of mothers with historical polygamy rates at
the sub-district level. We also instrument having a migrant sibling with the share of
male siblings to identify the causal effect of sibling rivalry.
We find a positive relationship between the polygyny status of mothers and chil-
dren migration decisions. Additionally, we provide suggestive evidence supporting
the idea that the effect is due to sibling rivalry: having migrant siblings (either full or
half) increases the likelihood of migrating. Our evidence suggests that co-wives’ ri-
valry as documented in the anthropological and economic literature trickles down to
children rivalry in migration. The results suggest that, in addition to economic rea-
sons documented in the migration literature, international migration is also driven
by social reasons.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview
of the related literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our empir-
ical framework and identification strategy. Section 5 provides the results. Section 6
summarizes and concludes.
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3.2 Related Literature
This work is mainly related to the microeconomic literature that focuses on the de-
terminants of migration. The classical economic theory of migration explains mi-
gration as a human capital investment decision. Individuals choose to migrate or
not by comparing the expected costs and benefits of moving (Sjaastad, 1962). This
early theory of migration has been followed by the New Economics of Labor Mi-
gration (NELM) pioneered by Stark and Bloom (1985). By contrast to the standard
classical model which considers migration as the result of an individual decision,
the NELM regards migration as a family decision taken in order to minimize risks
and overcome either temporary or more permanent liquidity constraints. Migration
in this setting is expected to result in remittances that will allow subsequent increase
in consumption, health, business investment and educational outcomes among re-
cipient households (Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006;
Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2005; Yang, 2008).
While the NELM literature stresses the important role of the family in migration
decisions, little is known about how the family structure itself affects individuals’
migration decisions. Exceptions include Bratti et al. (2016), Stöhr (2015) and Chort
and Senne (2015) and Chort and Senne (2018). Bratti et al. (2016) study the impact of
family size and sibling rivalry on migration from Mexico to the United States. Using
the ENADID dataset, a representative survey conducted in Mexico, they study the
impact of sibling size, birth order and sibling composition on migration decisions.
While they find no statistically significant effect of having more siblings on individ-
uals’ migration decisions, their results suggest that migration is not uniformly dis-
tributed among siblings, with older siblings being more likely to migrate (especially
firstborn males), and having older brothers relative to sisters reducing the likelihood
of migrating. Stöhr (2015) study the interaction of siblings’ migration decision in
Moldova, a country where children are expected to provide care and financial sup-
port to their elderly parents. According to the author, two opposing effects may arise
from this interaction. On the one hand, migrant family members can support each
other abroad and hence make migration more profitable, increasing the likelihood
that other siblings migrate as well. On the other hand, with more family members
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migrating, the marginal utility of staying and providing care to the elderly increases.
The results suggest that within the Moldavian context, the migration of siblings ac-
tually reduces individuals’ migration propensities, suggesting that the need to stay
at home to provide care to the elderly outweighs the network benefit that is due to
having siblings abroad. Last, Chort and Senne (2015) and Chort and Senne (2018)
focus on the selection process of migrants within their origin household using data
on Senegal. They find that households are more likely to select into migration mem-
bers with the highest remittances potential, which translates into individuals with
koranic schooling or being the eldest child or sibling of the household head being
more likely to migrate.
While some of the above studies highlight the impact of family size on migra-
tion, none to our knowledge has ever assessed the implications of a polygynous
family structure on migration outcomes. There exists however a literature offering
some insights on the causes and consequences of polygyny. On the causes, variables
explaining polygyny include distorted sex ratios (Becker, 1974), income inequality
(Grossbard-Shechtman, 1978), female agricultural productivity (Jacoby, 1995), the
slave trade (Dalton and Leung, 2014; Edlund and Ku, 2011), son preference (Mi-
lazzo, 2014), and colonial education (Fenske, 2015).
Regarding impact, the literature is composed of both macroeconomic and mi-
croeconomic analyses. On the macro side, several authors have investigated the
interaction between marriage systems and economic growth (Edlund and Lagerlof,
2004; Gould et al., 2008; Lagerlöf, 2005; Tertilt, 2005). According to this literature,
polygamy may hurt growth by reducing either human capital accumulation, as in
Edlund and Lagerlof (2004), or physical human accumulation (Tertilt, 2005).
On the micro side, the evidence suggests that polygyny may have impact on
household efficiency, savings and fertility decisions. Similar to monogamous house-
holds, polygamous households are inefficient in intra household allocation (Akresh
et al., 2012; Dauphin, 2013). Laiglesia and Morrisson (2008) and Boltz and Chort
(2016) show that polygyny affects households’ and wives’ saving behavior and Cud-
eville et al. (2017) show that polygyny affects female labour force participation.
Laiglesia and Morrisson (2008) provide descriptive evidence showing that polyg-
ynous households have lower savings or asset holdings in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire,
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and Indonesia. They argued that this is due to spending in bride price that divert
savings in other assets and high dependency ratio that lower disposable income and
thus savings. Boltz and Chort (2016) test another channel for the impact of polygamy
on saving decisions based on the strategic behaviors of monogamous wives “at risk”
of polygamy in Senegal. Using original individual panel data from a nationally rep-
resentative survey, they first predict the risk of transiting into a polygamous union
for individuals in a monogamous union. They then assess the impact of the pre-
dicted risk of polygamy on wives’ savings. Their results suggest that a higher risk
of polygamy has a positive impact on both wives’ stock of savings, especially formal
savings, and on their probability to save. Last, Cudeville et al. (2017) estimate the im-
pact of being in a polygynous union on labor force participation of women in Sene-
gal. They instrument polygynous status of women with district level polygamy rates
and show a positive impact of polygynous status of women on labor force partici-
pation. They propose two explanations for this effect. They argue that higher labor
force participation of polygynous women is a strategic choice to increase autonomy
and secondly, women in polygynous union benefit from domestic labor sharing.
The impact of polygyny on fertility has been well documented especially in the
demographic literature. The empirical evidence suggests a negative relationship be-
tween polygyny and fertility of women at the individual level (Garenne and Walle,
1989; Pebley and Mbugua, 1989) but a positive one at the aggregate level (Cahu et al.,
2014). The main reason for the low fertility of polygynous women as highlighted by
the literature is due to low frequency of intercourse as wives have to rotate bed time
(Anderton and Emigh, 1989), overrepresentation of childless women (Timæus and
Reynar, 1998), increased age gaps between spouses especially for late unions which
lead to a growth of infertile unions (Garenne and Walle, 1989), and “favoritism”
arising from unequal rotation of bed time (Lardoux and Walle, 2003). The positive
aggregate effect of polygamy on fertility as pointed by Cahu et al. (2014) is due to an
increase in the number of marriages, and the contagious aspect of fertility: women
who live in polygynous neighborhoods have been found to have a higher fertility,
irrespective of their polygynous status.
Furthermore, the literature offers interesting contributions on the interaction of
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wives in polygynous family structures. Qualitative evidence suggests co-wives’ con-
flict and reproductive rivalry (Jankowiak et al., 2005; Bove et al., 2014) which is also
associated with higher child mortality rates (Strassmann, 1997; Kazianga and Klon-
ner, 2006). The contribution of Rossi (2018) offers the first quantitative evidence
that the competition between co-wives drives fertility upwards in Senegal. Theoret-
ically, the author highlights different mechanisms that explain how polygamy may
affect fertility: competition effect between co-wives, substitution effect from the hus-
band side as he cares about the total number of children; and natural effect due to
less frequent intercourse and hence longer birth spacing. While these mechanisms
have some opposite effects, the empirical evidence suggests that the overall effect
of polygamy is a reduction in fertility, even though co-wife reproductive rivalry is
a strong upward force, meaning that the natural effect outweighs the competition
effect. Additionally, the author provides evidence on interesting strategic responses
between co-wives: first, second wives shorten their birth spacing when they face a
more fertile co-wife; second, wives respond to the gender composition of their chil-
dren and co-wives’ children. The higher the incentive (as measured by husbands’
wealth), the more pronounced these strategic responses.
3.3 Country Context: Mali
Mali is a landlocked country with an estimated population of 18 million people. The
country is classified as a poor country with a GDP per capita of $2,200 in 2017 and
a low human development index, positioning it at 182 out of 188 countries (UNDP,
2018). Economic growth resulting from good results in the secondary and service
sectors was estimated at 5.4 percent in 2017, while growth in the primary sector
deteriorated due to decreased rainfall (World Bank, 2019).
The 2012 military coup combined with the occupation of the Northern regions
by armed groups led to political instability in the country. In 2013, upon the request
by the government, France intervened militarily and in 2015, a peace agreement was
signed between the government and the Tuareg separatists. The 2012 instability led
to an internal displacement of more than 300,000 people and more than 185,000 fled
to neighboring countries as refugees (IOM, 2013).
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Mali has a long history of international migration and serves as transit point for
many migrants, especially Sub-Saharan Africans. The current population of its di-
aspora is debatable with estimates greatly varying between sources. According to
United Nations (2017) and Migration, DRC (2007), the number of number of emi-
grants in year 2000 are estimated at 722,660 and 1,578,695 respectively. More than
half of Malian migrants reside in Côte d’Ivoire and Nigeria, while about 10 percent
reside in the European Union (Urso, 2017).
Like many Sub-Saharan African countries, polygamy is legal and widely prac-
ticed in the country. The 2011 family code recognizes religious and civil marriages.
The civil marriage law allows couples to decide between polygamy and monogamy
(Dissa, 2016). About 35 percent of married women in our sample are in polygynous
unions with the majority (28 percent) having one co-wife. The typical polygamous
household structure is composed of a male household head, his wives, his children
and his grandchildren. Note that co-wives sometimes reside in different households.
3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main source of data used in this study comes from the 2016 EMOP survey ("En-
quête Modulaire et Permanente auprès des Ménage"). The EMOP survey is a nationally
representative survey conducted in four waves on an annual basis by the Malian Na-
tional Statistics Office (NSO). It general covers a large sample of households from all
the regions of the country, except when security reasons prevent the NSO from do-
ing so as in the Kidal region in the latest editions. While the questionnaires remains
roughly the same from one year to another, the 2016 edition has added modules that
have been designed with the technical support of some researchers from DIAL.4
They were included in order to provide a comprehensive description of households’
structure and to collect detailed information on both the marital history of all adults
and the complete birth history of all married women. A total of 6,132 households
were surveyed in this edition. The EMOP data set is thus rich, with demographic
4These modules have been added in order to feed the POLECOMI research project coordinated
by Sandrine Mesplé-Somps and Lisa Chauvet funded by ANR (Grant agreement ANR-11-BSH1-0012)
and the European Union under the 7th Research Framework Programme (Grant agreement 290752).
One of the objectives of this project is to assess the impact of migration on fertility and gender norms.
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information of all household members (be they residents or migrants) and their mi-
gration history. Given the complexity of family structure in Mali, establishing fam-
ily links between all household members and filiations in particular is challenging.
However, the survey contains several questions of interest that allow us to identify
the descendants and relatives in the ascending line of all resident individuals, pro-
vided they reside in the household (“Is your mother/father alive?”, “If yes and if
she/he lives in the household, give her/his name”). The survey questionnaire also
contains a module on the fertility history of all married women aged 15 and above.
This gives us the unique opportunity to know the total number of descendants of all
women, be they alive or not, and living in the household or not. Moreover, this fer-
tility rooster is very useful for identifying the biological parents of household mem-
bers who were in migration at the time of the survey. This is achieved by matching
migrants’ names reported in the migration module with the names of the children
listed by their mothers. Namesakes being common within a given household, we
condition the matching procedure with the age reported in both modules. Combin-
ing those information enables us to ascertain how household members and current
migrants are related biologically. Last and importantly for our analysis, the data set
gives the marital status and type (monogamous versus polygamous) of all married
men and women in the household. Married women who have at least one co-wife
(co-residing or not) are defined as women in a polygynous marriage.
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics of our individuals of interest. We re-
strict the sample to male individuals aged 15 to 40 whose mothers were present in
the household at the time of the survey.5 The sample is composed of 2,808 males
coming from 1,033 households. Age is defined as age at the time of the survey for
non-migrants and age at which they migrated for migrants. Its average value in the
sample is 22 years. In terms of education, 56 percent have attended formal education
with an average of 4 completed years of education. On average, they have a total of 5
siblings, with 4 full-siblings (sibling with same mother and father) and 1 half-sibling
(siblings with same father but different mother). The migrant sample is composed
of current migrants who used to reside in the household and former migrants who
5Unfortunately, when mothers are not in the household or are not alive anymore, the survey pro-
vides no information on them.
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TABLE 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Individual Characteristics
Age 2808 22.100 6.263 15 40
Formal education 2808 0.559 0.497 0 1
Years of education 2808 3.915 3.886 0 11
Total siblings 2808 5.432 2.788 1 17
Full-siblings 2808 4.211 1.948 1 15
Half siblings 2808 1.220 2.128 0 13
Migrated 2808 0.155 0.362 0 1
Migrated internally 2808 0.069 0.254 0 1
Migrated internationally 2808 0.086 0.280 0 1
Returnees 2808 0.039 0.193 0 1
Parents’ Characteristics
Fathers’ no of wives 2808 1.408 0.615 1 4
Father migrated 2808 0.297 0.457 0 1
Father’s age 2808 59.574 10.541 21 98
Father formal education 2808 0.210 0.407 0 1
Father’s years of education 2808 1.416 3.066 0 11
Mother’s age 2808 47.247 8.895 20 80
Mother formal education 2808 0.112 0.316 0 1
Mother’s years of education 2808 0.636 2.009 0 11
Mother’s marital status
Monogamous 2808 0.654 0.476 0 1
Polygynous [1 co-wife] 2808 0.290 0.454 0 1
Polygynous [2 co-wives] 2808 0.050 0.218 0 1
Polygynous [3 co-wives] 2808 0.006 0.078 0 1
Mother is polygynous 2808 0.346 0.476 0 1
Household Characteristics
Household head gender 1033 0.139 0.347 0 1
Household size 1033 8.718 4.990 2 44
Log(expenditure) 1033 10.763 0.601 8 13
Urban 1033 0.453 0.498 0 1
Region
Kayes 1033 0.155 0.362 0 1
Koulikoro 1033 0.163 0.369 0 1
Sikasso 1033 0.153 0.360 0 1
Segou 1033 0.138 0.346 0 1
Mopti 1033 0.116 0.321 0 1
Tombouctou 1033 0.097 0.296 0 1
Gao 1033 0.054 0.227 0 1
Bamako 1033 0.124 0.330 0 1
Source: EMOP 2016 Survey and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The sample includes only male household members aged 15-
40 years whose mothers are living in the household. The sample com-
prises 2808 individuals from 1033 households.
were back in their origin household at the time of the survey. About 15 percent of
the whole sample have had a least one migration experience in the sample. Internal
migrants are individuals belonging to the household but currently residing within
the country constitute about 7 percent of the whole sample. International migrants
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on the other hand, are individuals belonging to the household but currently/were
residing outside the country constitute about 7.8 percent of the whole sample. This
sample include returnees, who constitute about 3.9 percent of the entire sample.
Table 3.1 also provides statistics on the parents’ and household characteristics
of the sampled individuals. Fathers have 1.4 wives on average, and 29 percent mi-
grated at least once. Mothers are on average 47 years old and only 11 percent have
formal education, while fathers have an average age of 60 years and 24 percent have
attended at least one year of formal education. Importantly for our analysis, we ob-
serve that polygamy is relatively widespread. About 35 percent of the mothers in
our sample have reported being in a polygynous marriage, with a majority (83 per-
cent) having one co-wife, and 14 percent having 2 co-wives. The average household
size is close to 9 and 14 percent of them are headed by a female. Almost half (46 per-
cent) of the households reside in urban areas. Regionally, 17 percent of households
in our sub-sample lives in Koulikoro, followed by Kayes (16 percent), Sikasso (15
percent), Segou (14 percent), Bamako (12 percent), Mopti (11 percent), Tombouctou
(10 percent), and Gao (5 percent).
How different are migrants and non-migrants within our sample? Table 3.2
provides descriptive statistics of non-migrants (2364), internal migrants (193) and
international migrants (240). Columns 3 report the p-values from mean comparison
of individuals’, parents’ and household characteristics of non-migrants and internal
migrants. While age is not significantly different between non-migrants and inter-
nal migrants, non-migrants are statistically more educated, have more siblings, and
younger parents. Furthermore, the data suggests that there is no statistically sig-
nificant difference in the polygynous status of non-migrants and internal migrants.
Last, internal migrants are more likely come from smaller households and rural ar-
eas.
Column 3 of Table 3.2 shows perhaps a more interesting comparison between
international migrants and non-migrants. This comparison reveals statistical differ-
ences between the two groups in terms of age, education, parents’ characteristics,
mothers’ polygynous status and location. The international migrant sample is sig-
nificantly older, less likely to be educated with less completed years of education
on average, and has more siblings. Moreover, international migrants are statistically
78 Chapter 3. Polygamy, Sibling Rivalry and Migration
TABLE 3.2: Summary Statistics: Statistical Differences between Mi-
grants and Non-migrants
Non Internal International P-value P-Value
migrants Migrants Migrants
(1) (2) (3) (1-2) (1-3)
Individual Characteristics
Age 22.008 22.083 23.029 0.851 0.003**
Formal education 0.574 0.596 0.388 0.547 0.000***
Years of education 4.019 4.699 2.258 0.036* 0.000***
Total siblings 4.338 5.813 5.004 0.000*** 0.000***
Full-siblings 3.174 4.596 3.875 0.000*** 0.000***
Half siblings 1.165 1.218 1.129 0.719 0.783
Parents’ Characteristics
Fathers’ no of wives 1.391 1.446 1.542 0.236 0.001**
Father migrated 0.271 0.347 0.517 0.033 0.000***
Father’s age 59.712 57.523 59.871 0.003* 0.811
Father formal education 0.216 0.249 0.117 0.309 0.000***
Father’s years of education 1.463 1.839 0.613 0.153 0.000***
Mother’s age 47.516 45.249 46.204 0.001*** 0.019*
Mother formal education 0.117 0.109 0.067 0.721 0.004**
Mother’s years of education 0.662 0.705 0.325 0.802 0.000***
Mother’s marital status
Monogamous 0.669 0.617 0.537 0.150 0.000***
Polygynous [1 co-wife] 0.277 0.321 0.388 0.207 0.001***
Polygynous [2 co-wives] 0.047 0.062 0.071 0.398 0.165
Polygynous [3 co-wives] 0.007 0.000 0.004 0.000*** 0.563
Mother is polygynous 0.331 0.383 0.463 0.150 0.000***
Household head gender 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.045* 0.045*
Household size 12.751 11.725 13.992 0.016** 0.012*
Log (expenditure) 10.574 10.567 10.486 0.856 0.011*
Urban 0.370 0.228 0.237 0.000*** 0.000***
Region
Kayes 0.171 0.155 0.417 0.561 0.000***
Koulikoro 0.173 0.062 0.042 0.000*** 0.000***
Sikasso 0.210 0.503 0.342 0.000*** 0.000***
Segou 0.126 0.098 0.021 0.229 0.000***
Mopti 0.105 0.161 0.154 0.044* 0.045**
Tombouctou 0.048 0.010 0.004 0.000*** 0.000***
Gao 0.032 0.010 0.004 0.018* 0.000***
Bamako 0.135 0.000 0.017 0.000*** 0.000***
Observations 2364 193 240 2557 2604
Source: EMOP 2016 Survey and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The sample includes only male household members aged 15-40 years whose moth-
ers are living in the household. The sample comprises 2808 individuals from 1033 house-
holds.
more likely to have mothers who are less educated, younger, and in a polygynous
marriage (46 percent versus 38 percent) than non-migrants. Last, in terms of their
geographic origin, migrants are more likely to come from rural areas and as shown
in Azam and Gubert (2005), they are more likely to come from the Kayes and Sikasso
regions.
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In addition to the EMOP survey data, we mobilise the 1987 Malian census col-
lected by Malian National Statistics Office (NSO) to compute historical polygamy
rates at the sub-district level. This variable will be used as an instrument in our
empirical analyses in order to identify a causal link between mothers’ polygamous
status and migration.
3.5 Empirical Framework
3.5.1 Empirical Methodology
We want to assess whether a polygamous family structure affects migration deci-
sions. To this end, we consider the following regression specification:
Yih = α0 + α1Polyih + βXih + eih (3.1)
where Yih is the migration decision of an individual i from household h which
is equal to 1 if the individual has ever migrated or is a current migrant and 0 oth-
erwise. We further distinguish between internal migration and international migra-
tion. Polyih is i’s mother’s polygynous status which equals 1 if the mother has at
least one co-wife and 0 otherwise. Xih is a vector of both individual characteris-
tics (including age, age squared, number of siblings, birth order dummies, dummy
for whether father has migrated before, years of education, father’s years of educa-
tion and mother’s age) and household characteristics (including household size, sex
of household head, log of household quarterly consumption expenditure, an urban
area dummy, and regional dummies). eih is random error term.
Selection into polygamy remains an important concern. For example, men who
are wealthier might afford marrying more wives or those who are subsistence farm-
ers may be more likely to be polygamous in order have more children for labor
supply. Moreover, polygamy has been shown to alter wives’ saving decisions (Boltz
and Chort, 2016) and fertility (Rossi, 2018) through competition among co-wives. All
this evidence suggests that indeed the polygynous status of mothers can be endoge-
nous to migration. This calls for an identification strategy to solve this endogeneity
problem.
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3.5.2 Identification Strategy
To identify the causal effect of polygyny on migration, we need some exogenous
source of variation. The ideal source of variation is one that affects the polygynous
status of mothers without affecting the subsequent migration decisions of their chil-
dren. Following the migration literature that employs historical instruments 6 and
Cudeville et al. (2017), we propose one variable that satisfies this condition: the his-
torical polygamy rate at the sub-district level. Why would historical polygamy rates
affect the current polygynous status of women? Boltz and Chort (2016) show that
the polygamy status of a father affects the polygamy status of his children suggest-
ing that living in places where polygamy is widely practiced might affect subsequent
polygamy rates. We use the 1987 Malian census to calculate the polygamy rate at the
sub-district level. It is computed by combining the share of married men who are
polygamous with the ethnicity polygamous propensity. The ethnic propensities are
computed using probit regression of polygamy status of married men on ethnicity
dummies. Using these computed propensities for each ethnic group, we defined the
polygamy rate at sub-district level as the sum across ethnic groups of the product of
share of polygamous married men (see Figure 3.2) and the ethnic propensities. The
logic for using this re-weighted polygamy rate instead of a simple share of married
men in a polygamous union is because polygamy is heterogeneous across ethnic
groups as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
While our instrument is a good predictor of the polygynous status of women,
we still need to check if it meets the exclusion restriction according to which the his-
torical polygamy rate should affect subsequent migration decisions only through its
effect on the polygynous status of mothers. A plausible counter-argument could be
that those sub-districts with high polygamy rates are the ones with high migration
rates given that historical migration rates predict subsequent migration rates; we
thus mitigate this threat by controlling for historical migration (number of returnees
in the sub-district computed from 1998 census and dummy for whether father has
migrated before). Another threat could be that sub-districts with high historical
6McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) for example both employ his-
torical migration rates to instrument migration in Mexico.
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polygamy rates are those which are richer (since it is costly to support many de-
pendents) or highly populated. To allow for this possibility, we include additional
controls such as log of the sub-district population computed from the 1987 census
and current household wealth proxy (household expenditure). Last, one might ar-
gue that migration changes social norms (polygamy included) as evidenced in the
literature7, resulting in a threat of reverse causality. We argue that since we are inter-
ested in the migration decisions of children instead of their parents, this possibility
is less likely. Additionally, we control for many confounding factors that could af-
fect both polygamy and children migration decisions such as parents’ characteristics
including migration history, years of education, and age.
3.6 Empirical Results
3.6.1 Polygyny and Migration
The estimation is conducted through two stage least squares (2SLS) and bivariate
probit. While the 2SLS estimator produces results that are easy to interpret, the es-
timation strategy only recovers the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). In other
terms, the estimated effect is associated with the subset of the population whose
decision to be in a polygamous union is affected by the instrument. Though the
bivariate probit estimator mitigates this problem by recovering average treatment
effects, estimates in this setting are sensitive to including more controls (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008).
Table 3.3 presents the estimated impact of the polygamous status of mothers
on their children’s migration decisions, where migration is defined irrespective of
whether it is internal or external. The first two columns offer correlations obtained
from OLS estimation while the last column provides the results from the two stage
least squares estimation. In column 1, we observe a positive and significant associ-
ation between polygyny and migration. However, once we include individual and
7Tuccio and Wahba (2015), Beine et al. (2013) and Bertoli and Marchetta (2015) show that migration
affect gender norms in sending countries.
82 Chapter 3. Polygamy, Sibling Rivalry and Migration
TABLE 3.3: Mother Polygynous and Migration
(OLS) (IV)
Migrate Migrate Migrate
(1) (2) (3)
Mother is polygynous 0.0659*** -0.0398** 0.5240*
(0.0177) (0.0192) (0.2800)
First stage-Mother is polygynous
1987 sub-district polygamy rate 1.8925***
(0.5209)
F-Statistic 13.54
Individual’s controls No Yes Yes
Household level controls No Yes Yes
Regional indicators No Yes Yes
Mean of dep.var 0.078 0.078 0.078
N 4010 2808 2808
Source: EMOP 2016 Survey and authors’ calculations.
Note: Regressions estimated using ordinary least squares and two
staged least squares. Migrate is a binary variable taking value 1 if
the respondent is a migrant or migrated and 0 otherwise. Mother is
polygynous is a binary variable taking value 1 if mother is in a polyg-
ynous union and 0 otherwise. 1987 sub-district polygamy rate is the
share of married men in a polygynous union re-weighted by the eth-
nic propensity to be a polygamous union. Individual’s controls in-
clude age, age squared, years of education, number of siblings, sib-
ling order dummies, mother’s age, father’s years of education, and
father’s migration history dummy. Other controls include household
head gender, household size, urban area dummy, regional dummies,
1987 sub-district log population, 1998 sub-district ratio of returnees
to population. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at sub-
district level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at
1%.
household controls into the regression, the estimate turns negative and statistically
significant (column 2)8.
In column 3, we instrument the polygynous status of mothers with the 1987
reweighted sub-district historical polygamy rate. The F-statistic from the first stage
suggests that indeed historical polygamy rate predicts polygynous status. Results
from the second stage show a positive relationship between mothers’ polygynous
status and migration decisions: individuals whose mothers are in polygynous mar-
riage are about 52 percentage points (pp) more likely to migrate.
In Table 3.4, we consider the effect on polygamy on internal migration only be-
cause it is plausible to assume that the drivers of internal migration differ from the
drivers of international migration. The dependent variable therefore is whether an
8The reason for the flip in the sign is potentially due to multicollinearity. Once we drop the age
squared and father’s years of education, the coefficient becomes positive and insignificant.
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individual is/was a migrant within the country. We similarly estimate the effect
using both OLS and 2SLS. We find that there is no statistically significant effect of
polygamy on internal migration which suggests that polygamy only affects interna-
tional migration.
TABLE 3.4: Mother Polygynous and Internal Migration
(OLS) (IV)
Migrate Migrate Migrate
(1) (2) (3)
Mother is polygynous 0.0247* -0.0333** 0.2266
(0.0149) (0.0145) (0.1659)
First stage-Mother is polygynous
1987 sub-district polygamy rate 1.8639***
(0.5209)
F-Statistic 13.54
Individual’s controls No Yes Yes
Household level controls No Yes Yes
Regional indicators No Yes Yes
Mean of dep.var 0.070 0.070 0.070
N 4010 2808 2808
Source: EMOP 2016 Survey and authors’ calculations.
Note: Regressions estimated using ordinary least squares and two
staged least squares. Migrate is a binary variable taking value 1 if
the respondent is a migrant or migrated within the country and 0
otherwise. Mother is polygynous is a binary variable taking value 1
if mother is in a polygynous union and 0 otherwise. 1987 sub-district
polygamy rate is the share of married men in a polygynous union re-
weighted by the ethnic propensity to be a polygamous union. Indi-
vidual’s controls include age, age squared, years of education, num-
ber of siblings, sibling order dummies, mother’s age, father’s years
of education, and father’s migration history dummy. Other controls
include household head gender, household size, urban area dummy,
regional dummies, 1987 sub-district log population, 1998 sub-district
ratio of returnees to population. Standard errors in parenthesis are
clustered at sub-district level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
In Table 3.5, we replicate the same specification using as dependent variable
our main variable of interest, that is international migration. Our OLS estimates in
column 1 suggest a positive association between polygamy and migrating interna-
tionally. Once we control for the endogeneity of polygamy, the magnitude of the
estimate increases and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The esti-
mated coefficient suggests that having a polygynous mother increases the likelihood
of migrating internationally by about 36 percentage points. It is worth highlighting
that our specification includes controls for individual, parents’ and household level
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characteristics and that standard errors are clustered at the sub-district level. Addi-
tionally, the F-statistic equals 13.54, which suggests that our instrument is strongly
correlated with polygamous status.
TABLE 3.5: Mother Polygynous and International Migration
(OLS) (IV)
Migrate Migrate Migrate
(1) (2) (3)
Mother is polygynous 0.0443*** -0.0020 0.3659*
(0.0139) (0.0162) (0.1947)
First stage-Mother is polygynous
1987 sub-district polygamy rate 2.0481***
(0.5566)
F-Statistic 13.54
Individual’s controls No Yes Yes
Household level controls No Yes Yes
Regional indicators No Yes Yes
Mean of dep.var 0.148 0.148 0.148
N 4010 2808 2808
Source: EMOP 2016 Survey and authors’ calculations.
Note: Regressions estimated using ordinary least squares and two
staged least squares. Migrate is a binary variable taking value 1 if
the respondent is a migrant or migrated outside the country and 0
otherwise. Mother is polygynous is a binary variable taking value 1
if mother is in a polygynous union and 0 otherwise. 1987 sub-district
polygamy rate is the share of married men in a polygynous union re-
weighted by the ethnic propensity to be a polygamous union. Indi-
vidual’s controls include age, age squared, years of education, num-
ber of siblings, sibling order dummies, mother’s age, father’s years
of education, and father’s migration history dummy. Other controls
include household head gender, household size, urban area dummy,
regional dummies, 1987 sub-district log population, 1998 sub-district
ratio of returnees to population. Standard errors in parenthesis are
clustered at sub-district level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%;
***significant at 1%.
Finally, we present the estimates of the impact of the polygynous status of moth-
ers on children migration decisions using bivariate probit in Table 3.6. As expected,
the results are similar to the ones obtained with the 2SLS estimator albeit differences
in the magnitude of the effects. In column 1 of Table 3.6, the dependent variable is
migration status whatever the destination, internal or external, of the migrant. The
results suggest that having a mother in a polygynous marriage increases the prob-
ability of migrating by 35 percentage points. In column 2, we focus on only those
who have migrated within the country. The estimated coefficient, while positive, is
not statistically significant. Last, in column 3, the estimates suggest that the polyg-
ynous status of mothers indeed affects the likelihood of migrating internationally,
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with a marginal effect of about 19 percentage points. In summary, we consistently
observe that mothers’ polygynous status affect the decision of their sons to migrate
internationally. The question remains of why polygamy affects migration decisions.
To provide answers to this question, we turn to an investigation of the underlying
mechanisms in the following section.
TABLE 3.6: Mother Polygynous and Migration - Bivariate Probit
(1) (2) (3)
All Internal External
Migration Migration Migration
Mother is polygynous 1.4173*** 0.4903 1.0413***
(0.1715) (0.5194) (0.2689)
Marginal Effects 0.3585*** 0.0655 0.1886***
(0.0574) (0.0831) (0.0696)
First stage-Mother is polygynous
1987 sub-district polygamy rate 8.9379*** 8.8097*** 6.1238***
(1.3115) (1.3148) (1.3277)
Wald test of ρ (p-value) 0.0000 0.1766 0.0008
Individual’s controls No Yes Yes
Household level controls No Yes Yes
Regional indicators No Yes Yes
Mean of dep.var 0.148 0.070 0.078
N 2808 2808 2808
Source: EMOP 2016 Survey and authors’ calculations.
Note: Regressions estimated using a bivariate probit model. In column
1, estimation is done for all type (internal and international). In columns
2 and 3, migration is defined for migration within and outside the coun-
try respectively. Mother is polygynous is a binary variable taking value
1 if mother is in a polygynous union and 0 otherwise. 1987 sub-district
polygamy rate is the share of married men in a polygynous union re-
weighted by the ethnic propensity to be a polygamous union. Individ-
ual’s controls include age, age squared, years of education, number of sib-
lings, sibling order dummies, mother’s age, father’s years of education,
and father’s migration history dummy. Other controls include house-
hold head gender, household size, urban area dummy, regional dum-
mies, 1987 sub-district log population, 1998 sub-district ratio of returnees
to population. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at sub-district
level.*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
3.6.2 Mechanisms
In this section, we provide evidence on why polygamy affects migration by focusing
on the role of siblings’ migration. While having a household member with migra-
tion experience or even coming from areas with high migration history (migration
networks) can fuel subsequent migration (see e.g., Beine et al. (2011)), having full
or half migrant sibling might have different effect in addition to the pure migration
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network effect. Table 3.7 presents descriptive statistics on the incidence of migra-
tion depending on the number of siblings with some migration experience. The
first panel shows that the likelihood of being a migrant increase with the number
of migrant siblings. The incidence of migration among those who have no migrant
sibling is 7 percent while it is as high as 38 percent for those that have one sibling
with some migration experience. It then decreases for individuals having more than
one sibling with some migration experience, but the number of observations is very
small. In the second panel, we consider full siblings only. The average incidence
of migration is 11 percent. However, it increases to 31 percent for those individuals
having one full sibling with some migration experience and goes down to 7 percent
for those with no migrant full sibling. Finally, the last panel reports the incidence
of migration depending on the number of migrant half-siblings. The incidence of
migration jumps from 11 percent for those individuals with no migrant half-sibling
to 18 percent for those who have one migrant half-sibling.
TABLE 3.7: Probability of being a Migrant, Depending on Number of
Siblings with Migration Experience
Total No of migrant siblings Non-migrant Migrant Total
0 92.44 7.56 100.00
1 62.24 37.76 100.00
2 98.84 1.16 100.00
3 94.87 5.13 100.00
Total 89.03 10.97 100.00
No of migrant full-siblings
0 92.74 7.26 100.00
1 68.63 31.37 100.00
2 53.91 46.09 100.00
3 57.14 42.86 100.00
Total 89.01 10.99 100.00
No of migrant half-siblings
0 89.20 10.80 100.00
1 82.14 17.86 100.00
2 93.33 6.67 100.00
3 100.00 0.00 100.00
Total 89.03 10.97 100.00
N 3572 441 4013
Source: EMOP 2016 Survey and authors’ calculations.
Note: Migrant is a binary variable taking value 1 if individual is
a migrant or migrated outside the country and 0 otherwise. Full-
siblings is the number of siblings with the same mother and father.
Half-siblings is the number of siblings with same father but differ-
ent mother.
In Table 3.8, we estimate the correlation between having siblings or half-siblings
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with some migration experience on individuals’ migration decision. In column 1,
we observe a positive and statistically significant relationship between having a mi-
grant sibling and the likelihood of migrating. In column 2, we distinguish between
half-siblings and full-siblings. The resulting estimates suggest a positive (negative)
relation between full-sibling’s (half-sibling’s) migration status and individual mi-
gration status. However, in column 3, we interact migrant full-sibling status and
half-sibling status. This results show that having a half-sibling with some migration
experience conditional on having no migrant full-sibling increases the likelihood of
migrating of about 8 percentage points. Similarly, having a full-sibling with some
migration experience conditional on having no migrant half-sibling increases the
likelihood of migrating of 28 percentage points.
Moving on, Table 3.9 offers more evidence on the relationship between siblings’
migration status and individuals’ migration decision. Columns 1 and 2 report OLS
estimates while columns 3 and 4 present 2SLS estimates. We instrument the variable
“having a full-sibling with some migration experience” with the ratio of the number
of male full-siblings to total number of full-siblings. Similarly, the variable “hav-
ing a half-sibling with some migration experience” is instrumented with the ratio
of the number of male half-siblings to total number of half-siblings. The logic be-
hind using these instruments is that men have a higher probability of migrating in
the Malian setting and that the sex composition of children is random in the Malian
context where there is no sex selective abortion. Column 3 shows the effect of having
a full-sibling with some migration experience on the likelihood of migrating. Esti-
mates of the first-stage produce a F-statistic of 20 and show a positive relationship
between having a full-sibling with some migration experience and the share of male
full-siblings. The second-stage estimates show that having at least one full-sibling
with some migration experience increases the likelihood of migrating by 35 percent-
age points. Similarly, in column 3, we observe a positive and marginally significant
effect of having a half-sibling with some migration experience on the likelihood of
migrating by 50 percentage points. Overall, there is thus suggestive evidence that
the migration behavior of both full and half-siblings affects one individual’s own
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TABLE 3.8: Mother Polygynous and International Migration - OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Migrate Migrate Migrate
SibMigrate 0.1774***
(0.0238)
FullSibMigrate 0.2414***
(0.0263)
HalfSibMigrate -0.0332
(0.0392)
FullSibMigrate=0 × HalfSibMigrate=1 0.0853*
(0.0455)
FullSibMigrate=1 × HalfSibMigrate=0 0.2714***
(0.0276)
FullSibMigrate=1 × HalfSibMigrate=1 -0.0190
(0.0523)
Observations 2815 2815 2815
R2 0.134 0.162 0.175
Individual’s controls No Yes Yes
Household level controls No Yes Yes
Regional indicators No Yes Yes
Mean of dep.var 0.078 0.078 0.078
N 2808 2808 2808
Source: EMOP 2016 Survey and authors’ calculations.
Note: Regressions estimated using ordinary least squares and two staged
least squares. Migrate is a binary variable taking value 1 if the respondent is
a migrant or migrated outside the country and 0 otherwise. SibMigrate is a
binary variable taking value 1 if individual has a sibling who has migrated
and 0 otherwise. FullSibMigrate is a binary variable taking value 1 if indi-
vidual has a full-sibling who has migrated and 0 otherwise. HalfSibMigrate
is a binary variable taking value 1 if individual has a half-sibling who has mi-
grated and 0 otherwise. Individual’s controls include age, age squared, years
of education, number of siblings, sibling order dummies, mother’s age, fa-
ther’s years of education, and father’s migration history dummy. Other con-
trols include household head gender, household size, urban area dummy,
and regional dummies. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at sub-
district level.*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
migration decision. In particular, we find that the effect of having at least one half-
sibling with some migration experience has a larger effect on the likelihood of mi-
grating than having at least one full-sibling with some migration experience. This
piece of evidence is in line with the literature that shows that there exist co-wives’
competition in fertility decision (see e.g., Rossi (2018)). This suggests that interna-
tional migration decisions are also driven by social reasons.
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TABLE 3.9: Mother Polygynous and International Migration - IV
(OLS) (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Migrate Migrate Migrate Migrate
FullSibMigrate 0.2400*** 0.3744**
(0.0261) (0.1712)
HalfSibMigrate -0.0034 0.5555*
(0.0361) (0.3032)
First stage-Sibling Migrate
Share of Full Male Siblings 0.0347***
(0.0077)
Share of Full Male Siblings 0.1466***
(0.0332)
F-Statistic 20.15 19.52
Individual’s controls No Yes Yes Yes
Household level controls No Yes Yes Yes
Regional indicators No Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep.var 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078
N 2808 2808 1981 931
Source: EMOP 2016 Survey and authors’ calculations.
Note: Regressions estimated using ordinary least squares and two staged
least squares. Migrate is a binary variable taking value 1 if the respondent
is a migrant or migrated outside the country and 0 otherwise. FullSibMigrate
is a binary variable taking value 1 if individual has a full-sibling who has mi-
grated and 0 otherwise. HalfSibMigrate is a binary variable taking value 1 if
individual has a half-sibling who has migrated and 0 otherwise. Individual’s
controls include age, age squared, years of education, mother’s age, father’s
years of education, and father’s migration history dummy. Other controls in-
clude household head gender, household size, urban area dummy, and re-
gional dummies. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at sub-district
level. *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
3.7 Conclusion
This study is perhaps the first to examine the casual impact of polygamy family
structure on international migration decisions. We contribute to the growing eco-
nomic literature examining the determinants of international migration by introduc-
ing the role of the polygynous status of mothers; a marriage outcome faced by more
than one quarter of women in Sub-Saharan Africa. We use data from a rich repre-
sentative household survey and census from Mali; a country with long history of
international migration and high polygamy rate to estimate the impact the polyg-
ynous status of mothers on children migration decisions. We address the identifi-
cation challenges due to selection into polygyny status of mothers through instru-
mentation strategy by using the historical sub-district polygamy rates. Additionally,
to shed light on the mechanisms, we instrument having a migrant sibling with the
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share of male siblings.
We find that children of mothers in polygynous unions are more likely to migrate
internationally. We explain the results by providing supportive evidence suggesting
that it is due to sibling rivalry; having both full and half migrant sibling increases
the likelihood of migrating. Our evidence suggests that co-wives’ rivalry as docu-
mented in Rossi (2018) trickles down to children rivalry in migration. Our overall
results suggest that, in addition to economic reasons, international migration is also
driven by social reasons. Our findings raise interesting questions for further research
such as how these households decide the optimal number of migrants to send and
also whether and who (among the children of his wives) fathers decide to migrate,
given that there might be preferences to having some remaining home in order to
help manage the household and/or provide care for aging parents as highlighted in
Stöhr (2015).
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Figures
FIGURE 3.1: Estimated Probability of Being in a Polygynous Union
by Maternal Language in 1987
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FIGURE 3.2: Share of Married Men in a Polygynous Union in 1987
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Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis was to contribute to our understanding of the drivers
of international migration by asking the following novel research questions. How
does occupation-skill mismatch affect the selection of immigrants? How does uncer-
tainty about the risks of dying en route and chances of obtaining legal status affect
the willingness to migrate illegally? How does polygamous family structure affect
international migration decisions? We answer these questions by utilizing data from
three countries; Portugal, The Gambia, and Mali.
In the first chapter we document that immigrants from 40 origin countries in
Portugal face high incidences of occupational-skill mismatch. We show that these
incidences of mismatch affect the selection or type of migrants coming into the
country. The results show that the incidence of overeducation leads to negative
selection while correct occupational-skill matches leads to positive selection of im-
migrants. Given the potential benefits of international migration as documented in
the literature, these results have policy implications. Receiving countries’ selective
policies aimed at attracting high skilled immigrants should also focus on reducing
occupation-skill mismatch, probably through degree recognition and standardiza-
tion in collaboration with sending countries; and this will subsequently benefit home
countries not only through the increases in income and remittances but also incen-
tives for investment in human capital.
In the second chapter we implemented a lab-in-the-field experiment to under-
stand willingness to migrate illegally by focusing on a sample of male youths aged
15 to 25 in The Gambia, the country with the highest proportion of illegal migration
flows to Europe. We showed that potential migrants overestimate both the risk of
dying en route to Europe, and the probability of obtaining legal residency status.
The experimental results suggest that the willingness to migrate illegally is affected
by information on the chances of dying en route and of obtaining a legal residence
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permit. Our estimates show that providing potential migrants with official num-
bers on the probability of obtaining a legal residence permit and the risk of dying
en route affect the likelihood of migrating. This has the potential to help migrants
make informed decisions and perhaps save lives.
In the final chapter we showed that polygamous family structure affects inter-
national migration decisions. We showed that children of mothers in polygynous
unions are more likely to migrate internationally. We explain the results by provid-
ing supportive evidence suggesting that it is due to sibling rivalry; having migrant
full and half siblings increases the likelihood of migrating. Our evidence suggests
that co-wives’ rivalry as documented elsewhere trickles down to children’s rivalry
in migration, suggesting that while neglected in the literature, family structure is
crucial to understanding migration. Our findings in this chapter raise interesting
questions for further research, such as how these households decide on the optimal
number of migrants to send and also whether and who (among the children of his
wives) fathers choose for migration, given that there might be preferences to having
some remaining home in order to help manage the household and/or provide care
for aging parents.
In sum, this thesis contributes to our understanding of what drives interna-
tional migration. It focuses on three different drivers of international migration:
occupation-skill mismatch, uncertainty about the risks of dying en route and chances
of obtaining legality status, and the polygamous family structure.
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Résumé
Cette thèse vise à contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des facteurs qui agis-
sent sur la décision de migrer des individus. Dans le chapitre 1, nous montrons
qu’au Portugal, les immigrés occupent souvent des postes pour lesquels ils sont
surqualifiés, et que cette non-adéquation entre profils et emplois occupés influence
la sélection dans la migration. Les phénomènes de surqualification, plus marqués
chez les individus les plus qualifiés, entrainent une sélection négative des migrants,
tandis qu’une bonne adéquation entre profils et emplois conduit à une sélection pos-
itive. Dans le chapitre 2, nous tirons profit d’une expérimentation sur le terrain pour
comprendre comment les décisions de migrer illégalement vers l’Europe des jeunes
gambiens sont influencées par l’information qu’ils ont sur les risques associés à cette
mobilité. Nous montrons d’abord que les participants au jeu surestiment à la fois
le risque de périr en route et la probabilité d’obtenir un statut légal en Europe. Nos
résultats suggèrent par ailleurs que la décision de migrer illégalement est influencée
par l’une et l’autre probabilité. Informer les candidats au départ sur les risques réels
encourus pourrait ainsi les aider à prendre des décisions en connaissance de cause
et contribuerait peut-être à sauver des vies. Dans le chapitre 3, nous examinons les
liens entre structure familiale et migration, en étudiant l’influence du type d’union
des mères sur le comportement migratoire de leurs enfants. Nous trouvons que les
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enfants nés de mères en union polygame sont plus enclins à migrer vers l’étranger.
Nous expliquons ce résultat par la rivalité fraternelle qui en découle.
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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the drivers
of international migration. In Chapter 1, we document that immigrants in Portugal
face a high incidence of occupational-skill mismatch, and show how it affects the
selection into migration. We find that the incidence of over-education leads to neg-
ative selection while correct occupational-skill matches lead to positive selection. In
Chapter 2, we rely on a lab-in-the-field experiment to understand the willingness
to migrate illegally of young males aged 15 to 25 in The Gambia. We first show
that potential migrants overestimate both the risk of dying en route to Europe, and
the probability of obtaining legal residency status. The experimental results suggest
that the willingness to migrate illegally is affected by information on the chances
of dying en route and of obtaining a legal residence permit. Providing providing
potential migrants with official numbers on both probabilities thus affect their likeli-
hood of migrating. This has the potential to help migrants make informed decisions
and perhaps save lives. In Chapter 3, we investigate the impact of family structure
on international migration decisions. We find that children of mothers in polygy-
nous unions are more likely to migrate internationally. We provide further evidence
suggesting that this result is due to sibling rivalry: having full- or half-siblings in mi-
gration increases the likelihood of migrating. Our evidence suggests that co-wives’
rivalry as documented elsewhere trickles down to children’s rivalry in migration,
suggesting that while neglected in the literature, family structure is crucial to under-
standing migration.
